

# Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power



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## **SUMMARY OF REVISIONS**

This change expands the presentation of US Air Force forces including an aerospace expeditionary squadron and discussion of elements below squadron level (pages 36-41); ensures consistency throughout in stating that the DIRMOPFOR reports to COMAFFOR/JFACC, not just the JFACC; clarifies the use and rationale behind the terms "air" and "aerospace" (page xi); changes "aerial occupation" to "aerial denial" (page 17); adds discussion of "air siege" operations (page 18), adds "freedom to maneuver" as a product of air superiority (page 19); expands discussion of command relationships, with examples (pages 43-46); refines discussion of space operations C2 (pages 75-76); adds clarifying language on managing logistics C2 chain (page 76); and expands discussion of centers of gravity (pages 89-90).

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## FOREWORD

The 1943 version of War Department Field Manual 100-20, *Command and Employment of Air Power*, opened with an unmistakably clear pronouncement which was printed in capital letters to emphasize its importance: **“LAND POWER AND AIR POWER ARE CO-EQUAL AND INTERDEPENDENT FORCES; NEITHER IS AN AUXILIARY OF THE OTHER.”** This theme was reemphasized on the second page when discussing command of airpower:

**THE INHERENT FLEXIBILITY OF AIR POWER IS ITS GREATEST ASSET. THIS FLEXIBILITY MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO EMPLOY THE WHOLE WEIGHT OF THE AVAILABLE AIR POWER AGAINST SELECTED AREAS IN TURN; SUCH CONCENTRATED USE OF THE AIR STRIKING FORCE IS A BATTLE WINNING FACTOR OF THE FIRST IMPORTANCE. CONTROL OF AVAILABLE AIR POWER MUST BE CENTRALIZED AND COMMAND MUST BE EXERCISED THROUGH THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER IF THIS INHERENT FLEXIBILITY AND ABILITY TO DELIVER A DECISIVE BLOW ARE TO BE FULLY EXPLOITED.**

*Air Force Doctrine Document 2 (AFDD 2), Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power*, demonstrates that good doctrine endures. This capstone document of our operational doctrine series, when taken together with the other keystone documents, **describes how our Air Force organizes and employs aerospace power throughout the spectrum of conflict at the operational level**. AFDD 2 is the companion document to **AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine**, which presents the fundamentals of aerospace power—what we, the Air Force, believe to be the best ways to organize and exploit the global capabilities and strategic perspective of aerospace power. AFDD 2 provides the unifying background for succeeding doctrinal publications that cover the specific operations, tactics, techniques, and procedures of the many elements that must work in concert for aerospace power to reach its full potential.

The concepts AFDD 2 introduces—the role of the Commander, Air Force Forces, the methodology for setting up Aerospace Expeditionary Task Forces, and the use of aerospace operations centers as the air commander’s “nerve centers” behind all aerospace operations—are foundations for all our operations. The details must be continually refined and captured in subsequent iterations of these documents.

Those who speak of a “revolution in military affairs” say three elements must come together: technology, doctrine, and organization. The United States Air Force has been honing the aerospace weapon—the technology piece—since its inception. The publication of Air Force Doctrine Documents 1 and 2 brings together the other two pieces—doctrine and organization.

Our operational doctrine, as embodied in AFDD 2 and the other keystone doctrinal publications, describes not only how we would command and employ aerospace forces to meet the threats and challenges facing us today, but also the point of departure for guiding our nation’s Air Force in meeting the challenges of tomorrow. Aerospace power is a critical—and decisive—element in protecting our nation and deterring aggression. It will only remain so if we, as professional airmen, study, evaluate, and debate our capabilities and the environment of the future. Just as technology, world threats, and opportunities change, so must our doctrine. We, each of us, must be articulate, knowledgeable, and unapologetic advocates of aerospace power.

**MICHAEL E. RYAN  
General, USAF  
Chief of Staff**

**17 February 2000**

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	vii
<b>OVERVIEW .....</b>	ix
<b>CHAPTER ONE—Aerospace Operations .....</b>	1
The Nature of Aerospace Power .....	1
An Airman's Perspective of the Levels of War .....	2
Aerospace Maneuver Warfare .....	4
Theater Air Component Objectives .....	6
Employment Options .....	7
Conflict Termination .....	9
The Contributions of Aerospace Power .....	12
Peacetime Engagement and Crisis Response .....	12
Deterrence and Contingency Actions .....	15
War-Winning Actions .....	18
<b>CHAPTER TWO—The Transition from Peace to Conflict .....</b>	25
Deliberate Versus Crisis Action Planning .....	25
The Crisis Action Planning Process .....	27
Other Force Generation Considerations .....	30
Reserve Component Mobilization .....	30
The Civil Reserve Air Fleet .....	30
Summary .....	31
<b>CHAPTER THREE—Organizing US Air Force Forces .....</b>	33
Fundamental Command and Organizational Concepts .....	33
The Aerospace Expeditionary Task Force .....	34
Presentation of US Air Force Forces .....	36
The Command Element .....	36
Aerospace Expeditionary Forces .....	38
Aerospace Expeditionary Wing .....	38
Aerospace Expeditionary Group .....	39
Aerospace Expeditionary Squadron .....	40
Expeditionary Elements below Squadron Level .....	40
Designation of Expeditionary Units .....	40
Multiple AEW Employment .....	41
Command Relationships .....	43
Assigning, Attaching, and Supporting .....	43
Command Relationship Models for Air Force Forces .....	44

<b>CHAPTER FOUR—Leading Expeditionary Aerospace Forces</b> .....	47
The Joint Force Commander .....	48
The Commander, Air Force Forces .....	51
The Joint Force Air Component Commander .....	54
COMAFFOR Headquarters Organization: The “A-Staff” .....	58
Air Mobility Integration .....	65
Director of Mobility Forces .....	67
Intertheater Operations .....	67
Operations Primarily Involving Air Mobility .....	68
Air Mobility Operations External to the Joint Task Force .....	68
<b>CHAPTER FIVE—The Joint Air Operations Center</b> .....	71
Primary JAOC Functions .....	71
The Aerospace Assessment, Planning, and Execution Process .....	72
Other Operational and Planning Considerations .....	74
Notional JAOC Organization .....	77
JAOC Director .....	78
Core Teams .....	78
Strategy Division .....	79
Combat Plans Division .....	80
Combat Operations Division .....	80
Air Mobility Division .....	81
Specialty Teams .....	81
Support Teams .....	82
Summary .....	83
<b>CHAPTER SIX—The Joint Air Operations Plan</b> .....	85
Planning Aerospace Operations .....	85
Five-Stage JAOP Planning Process .....	86
Stage 1: Operational Environment Research .....	87
Stage 2: Objective Determination .....	87
Stage 3: Center of Gravity Identification .....	89
Stage 4: Strategy Development .....	90
Stage 5: JAOP Development .....	92
<b>Suggested Readings</b> .....	95
<b>Appendices</b>	
A. Operations Report-3 .....	97
B. JCS Warning Order .....	99
C. Planning Order .....	105
D. Alert Order .....	111
E. Operation Order .....	115

F. Execute Order .....	119
G. Reserve Component Mobilization .....	123
H. Joint Air Operations Plan .....	125
<b>Glossary</b> .....	129



# **INTRODUCTION**

## **PURPOSE**

This document has been prepared under the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF). It establishes doctrinal guidance for organizing and employing aerospace forces at the operational level of conflict across the full range of military operations. It is the capstone of US Air Force operational-level doctrine publications. Together, these publications collectively form the basis from which commanders plan and execute their assigned aerospace missions and their actions as a component of a joint Service or multinational force.

## **APPLICATION**

This AFDD applies to all Air Force military and civilian personnel (including AFRC and ANG units and members). The doctrine in this document is authoritative but not directive. Therefore, commanders need to consider not only the contents of this AFDD, but also the particular situation when accomplishing their missions.

## **SCOPE**

Air Force assets (people, weapons, and support systems) can be used across the range of military operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. This AFDD discusses the fundamentals of organization and employment of Air Force air, space, and information capabilities to accomplish the missions assigned by commanders in chief (CINCs). More specific guidance on Air Force operations may be found in subordinate operational- and tactical-level doctrine documents.



## OVERVIEW

*To develop anything, the underlying thought and reason must govern, and then the organization must be built up to meet it.*

**Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell**



In 1991, the United States led a coalition of nations against the Iraqi military in Operation DESERT STORM. Since then, a wide variety of international crises and conflicts have resulted in a broader and more frequent use of US military forces to achieve national security objectives. Today's Air Force remains ready to respond with unmatched speed and efficiency to a wide range of contingencies around the world.

The US Air Force has reaffirmed valuable lessons about organizing to conduct expeditionary operations. New organizational paradigms now dictate clearer lines of authority, better unity of command, and a mechanism for commanding Air Force forces. Recent analyses of the potential offered by aerospace forces, coupled with innovations and advances in technology, point the way to a "new American way of war." This new operational way of war exploits the inherently offensive nature of the aerospace weapon to provide joint force commanders (JFCs) with additional options. It uses the rapid employment of sophisticated military capabilities to engage a broad array of targets simultaneously, strongly, and quickly, with discriminate application, to decisively shape the conflict and avoid the results of previous wars of attrition and annihilation.

**AFDD 2 builds upon the fundamentals presented in AFDD 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, and provides a broad overview of how the US Air Force transitions to contingency operations, organizes itself afield, and assesses, plans, and executes its assigned missions.** It expands upon and supersedes the *Presentation of USAF Forces*, known colloquially as the "Little Red Book." It presents nominal recommendations for organizing and operating Air Force forces afield. As with any doctrine, it is authoritative, but not directive. It is not meant to be all-inclusive, nor is it intended to cover every conceivable type of operation.

Every deployment will be different from previous ones. **Commanders must apply sound professional judgment in each situation.**

Furthermore, this document contains many extracts from joint publications and joint doctrine documents. Their inclusion here allows the reader to draw a more complete picture, from beginning to end, of the myriad events that must take place to deploy, plan, and employ US Air Force forces afield.

**Chapter one** presents **an overview of aerospace operations.** It first explores the nature of aerospace power and then talks about theater air component objectives, employment options, and conflict termination. The chapter concludes with an examination of types of aerospace actions.

**Chapter two** sketches **how a military response is created** due to a crisis, beginning with the National Command Authorities (NCA) decision process that leads to the employment of military forces. It provides an overview of how the US armed forces “spin up” to deploy, with emphasis on how US Air Force elements are brought into play, and illustrates when decisions are made that may affect the size and mission of US Air Force forces.

**Chapter three** discusses **how US Air Force forces are organized for expeditionary operations** and explains the mechanics for setting up Aerospace Expeditionary Task Forces (AETFs). US overseas-based forces have drawn down considerably since the Cold War. The US Air Force now has the challenge of deploying smartly and quickly from the continental United States (CONUS) to areas in which there is little or no in-place presence; therefore, it needs organizational models to support these deployments. The US Air Force should organize to provide clear lines of authority—airmen will lead airmen—and should present the JFC with a single face to execute the US Air Force element within a joint force.

**Chapter four** discusses leadership and command relationships. It provides **an overview of senior leadership relationships and responsibilities within a joint force.** This chapter outlines the roles, responsibilities, and command structures of the JFC, the Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR), and the joint force air component commander (JFACC).

**Chapter five** discusses the **joint air operations center** (JAOC). Regardless of the size of an operation, deployed US Air Force forces should

establish a command mechanism for internal control of US Air Force forces and for linkage to the JFC. This mechanism will be a JAOC, appropriately sized and tailored for the operation at hand. This chapter discusses JAOC functions, the process used within the JAOC for planning and executing aerospace operations, and notional JAOC organization.

**Chapter six** builds upon all the previous material and discusses the process for building the **Joint Air Operations Plan** (JAOP). Created during the execution planning phase of crisis action planning, the JAOP reflects how the JFC's overall operations concept is translated into a plan for employing joint aerospace forces.

Finally, **a note about the use of the term “aerospace.”** **Air Force doctrine recognizes the institutional shift within the US Air Force from “air” to “aerospace.”** The language in this document reflects that shift *when it is logical to do so*. However, it is not within the purview of Air Force doctrine to change terminology that has been formally accepted by the joint community as contained in **Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms**. For example, it is inappropriate within this document to change the “air” in “joint force air component commander” to “aerospace.” Thus, this document may use “aerospace operations center” in the Service context, but must use “joint air operations center” in the joint context. Similarly, current joint language recognizes the “air component commander,” but not an “aerospace component commander.” The use of “aerospace” in Service doctrine will, for the time being, remain in front of similar usage in joint terminology.



# CHAPTER ONE

## AEROSPACE OPERATIONS



*There are those who like to say we have four Air Forces in America—they are absolutely wrong. This nation has one Air Force. There are other services with air arms, and they are magnificent air arms, who focus on certain things in support of our national capabilities. But it is your Air Force that is charged with the full spectrum of capabilities. We are asked to provide for the nation air and space power, starting with science and technology; research and development; testing and evaluating; fielding, employing and sustaining air and space forces. We have no other tasks. That is our only job. It is not a diversion for us. We do it full time—all the time.*

General Ronald R. Fogleman

### THE NATURE OF AEROSPACE POWER

Aerospace power is the use of lethal and nonlethal means by aerospace forces to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Aerospace power can rapidly provide the national leadership a full range of military options for meeting national objectives and protecting national interests. From peacetime engagement to deterrence, from crisis response to winning wars, aerospace forces offer rapid, flexible, and effective lethal and nonlethal power.

Due to its speed and range, aerospace power operates in ways that are fundamentally different from other forms of military power. Aerospace power has the ability to focus the entire theater's efforts onto a single target or target set, unlike surface forces that typically divide up the battlefield into individual unit operating areas. **Airmen view the application of force more from a functional than geographic standpoint and classify targets by the effect their destruction has on the enemy rather than where the targets are physically located.**

## AN AIRMAN'S PERSPECTIVE OF THE LEVELS OF WAR

Warfare is typically divided into three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. *The focus at a given level of war is not on the specific weapons used, or on the targets attacked, but rather on the desired effects. A given airplane, dropping a given bomb, could comprise a tactical or strategic mission depending on the planned results.* Effects at the **strategic level of war** include destruction or disruption of the enemy's center(s) of gravity (COGs) or other vital target sets, including command elements, war-production assets, and key supporting infrastructure that impairs the enemy's ability or will to wage war or carry out aggressive activity. At this level the NCA, sometimes as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. These national objectives in turn provide the direction for developing overall military objectives, which in turn are used to develop the military objectives and strategy for each theater. In general terms, **the strategic level of war addresses the issues of WHY and WITH WHAT we will fight and WHY the enemy fights against us.**

At the other end of the spectrum lies **the tactical level of war**, where individual battles and engagements are fought. To the airman, the distinction between this level and higher levels of war is fairly clear-cut; we tend not to fight "battles" with aerospace power but focus at the tactical level on the individual engagement. The tactical level of aerospace warfare deals with how these packaged forces are employed, and the specifics of how engagements are conducted and targets attacked. In short, **the tactical level of war deals with HOW we fight.**

Between the strategic and tactical levels of war lies the **operational level of war**. At this level of war, campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic goals within theaters or areas of operations. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or




Figure 1.1. Levels of War

space than do tactics; they provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. Operational effects such as theater air superiority, command and control (C2) decapitation, and battle-field isolation are the tools with which the operational air commander supports the overall strategy. In terms of aerospace operational employment and targeting, planning at **the operational level of war determines WHAT we will attack, in WHAT order, and for WHAT duration.**

It may be more instructive to think of the operational level of war in terms of the concept of *operational art*. Operational art is the *process* of planning and sustaining operations and campaigns to meet strategic objectives; it is the *process* by which strategic guidance is turned into tactical tasking. Operational art determines what will be accomplished in the battlespace; it is guided by the “why” from the strategic level and implemented by the “how” at the tactical level. In terms of aerospace power employed against ground targets, for example, operational art determines how specific missions and assets will be used to achieve the



**During the Persian Gulf War, coalition air attacks first halted, then destroyed, Iraqi forces en route to the Saudi Arabian town of Khafji, much like these shown here. Aerospace power employment in that engagement isolated the battlefield, destroyed follow-on forces, halted the Iraqi offensive, and demonstrated to the Iraqis the futility of further offensive action. The strategic results included a reduction in the Iraqi army's overall will to fight.**

desired high-level effects and involves such areas as enemy assessment and analysis, targeting, and force packaging.

Focusing an entire theater's aerospace power in a central planning process maximizes the overall effect on the enemy, given a finite amount of aerospace power assets. The process of developing the joint air operations plan (JAOP), and executing it through an air tasking order (ATO), represents the operational art of aerospace warfare. Through this process, the air component commander (ACC) and his staff integrate all of the available assets into an optimized final product. During the execution phase, the ACC maintains centralized oversight of all required changes to the ATO due to unforeseen events or enemy reaction. This oversight function allows aerospace power to remain flexible during execution, while keeping the operational objectives of the ATO in sight.

Once the ATO is distributed to the wing and squadron level, the process arrives at the tactical level of war. Mission planning cells at these units plan the details for individual missions, which are then executed by individual strike packages, flights, or elements. The execution of these missions is decentralized, as the individual aircrews have considerable latitude on the tactical details of how they accomplish their assigned missions.

## **AEROSPACE MANEUVER WARFARE**

In the strategic sense, aerospace power conducts maneuver through global mobility and global attack. At this level of war, maneuver concerns such issues as ASETF deployment, overflight rights, intertheater airlift, and orbital access. Command and control of such globally deployed aerospace power is also involved. A theater CINC positioning forces so operational commanders can use them to greatest possible effect exemplifies strategic maneuver. This positioning includes not only the combat forces themselves, but also all of the combat support and infrastructure required for them to function. In simple terms, strategic maneuver involves deployment while operational and tactical maneuver concerns employment. Some missions can involve all three types of maneuver, such as when a deploying unit drops munitions en route to its deployed location or when a long-range bomber departs its CONUS home station, drops ordnance on a distant target, and returns.

Tactical maneuver is the most readily recognized form of maneuver and involves individual platforms using three-dimensional movement

through air or space to accomplish specific tasks. Examples include a fighter maneuvering to its opponent's six o'clock position for a gun kill, a bomber using terrain masking while inbound to the target, or a reconnaissance satellite performing an orbital plane change to overfly a desired point of interest. In these cases, aerospace assets use their common advantage of three-dimensional maneuver to achieve an advantage in the battlespace. While tactical maneuver emphasizes such technological measures of performance as "g-available" and "delta-v," tactical superiority only counts when it can be turned into an operational or strategic advantage.

Operating from the third dimension, **aerospace forces can strike directly at an adversary's centers of gravity and vital centers.** This capability allows aerospace forces to achieve effects beyond tactical success and at a tempo that disrupts the adversary's decision cycle. *By wresting the initiative, setting the terms of battle, establishing the tempo of operations, and taking advantage of tactical and operational opportunities, aerospace forces can defeat the adversary's strategy.* By focusing on this desired outcome of operational maneuver warfare, the advantages of aerospace power quickly become obvious. Aerospace power's ability to strike the enemy rapidly and unexpectedly across all of the critical points, from deep to shallow, adds a significant morale impact to an equally devastating physical blow. Surface maneuver warfare requires that small-unit commanders probe for weaknesses in the enemy line, which may then be exploited by larger mechanized formations.

**Aerospace forces, however, are able to proceed directly to their intended targets without the need for large-scale reaction to the enemy.** As such, they should be thought of as **true operational maneuver elements** in their own right, and **not just as "fires" supporting the surface component.** The ability to conduct this dislocation of the enemy hinges on gaining and maintaining air, space, and information superiority, which not only enables our air and surface components to employ operational maneuver against the enemy, but also prevents the enemy from doing the same to us.

**Aerospace maneuver forces operate across the theater or joint operations area (JOA) and are not restricted to geographic areas of operation as is typical with surface maneuver forces.** In some global power operations, the tactical operating area for a given mission may even exceed the JOA by a wide margin and can cross several geographic theater boundaries. This mandates a clear understanding of who

has operational and tactical control of aerospace maneuver forces as they perform their missions. Another result of the theaterwide scope of aerospace maneuver is that it is typically subdivided in terms of function, since subdivision into smaller geographic regions has historically impeded the effectiveness of aerospace forces.

Finally, traditional principles of warfare are increasingly coupled to the realization that the possession and manipulation of information itself can be a key element of the war-winning equation. Thus, more than at any other time in history, information has evolved from being only an adjunct supporting primary weapon systems to being, in many cases, itself a weapon or target, and perhaps being a field for operational maneuver.

## **THEATER AIR COMPONENT OBJECTIVES**

Once the theater commander's objectives and intent are communicated, the air component commander forms a concept of aerospace operations that supports the CINC's objectives. That is, the air component commander proposes operational aerospace objectives and devises a scheme of integrated operational actions to achieve theater objectives.

Theater and national objectives shape the conduct of theater aerospace strategy. Well-defined objectives give subordinate commanders a clear picture of the theater commander's intent for operations. As events progress, war rarely adheres closely to the original concept of operations. Knowing the theater air component objectives and understanding the concept of operations, subordinate air and space commanders are able to rapidly adapt to changing conditions in the battlespace. Accordingly, theater air component objectives allow latitude for judgment in a dynamic combat environment.

Centralized control provides strategic focus while decentralized execution allows operational flexibility to meet theater air component objectives. **Centralized planning is the first step in achieving effective centralized control, providing the optimum concentration of aerospace combat power at the required decisive points. Decentralized execution permits the flexibility to maximize tactical success.** This concept supports the inherent flexibility and versatility of aerospace power, giving commanders the tools to adapt to changing circumstances while remaining focused on campaign objectives.



**During DESERT STORM aerospace power executed simultaneous and lethal attacks across a variety of target sets.**

## **EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS**

**Parallel operations involve simultaneous attack of varied target sets to overwhelm and incapacitate an enemy, often resulting in decisive effects.** For example, in the Gulf War, the enemy command and control structure was severely degraded through parallel attacks on the electric grid, communications nodes, and command facilities. Although parallel operations have been conducted in the past, it usually took considerable time for the effects to be felt. In the meantime, the enemy was often able to establish alternate transportation and communication links, slowing or even negating the effects of those operations.

**Aerospace power is usually employed to greatest effect in parallel, asymmetric operations.** This includes precision strikes against surface forces, information attack against command and control systems, or precision strikes against infrastructure and COGs. Asymmetric attack uses the speed and range of aerospace power, coupled with its three-dimensional advantage, to strike the enemy where it hurts the most. Symmetric force-on-force warfare is sometimes required, such as the air-to-air combat often associated with achieving air superiority. At the beginning of a conflict, other offensive operations can sometimes be accomplished in parallel with counterair operations. If the enemy strongly challenges our air superiority, we may be forced into serial operations in which all available assets must be dedicated to winning air superiority before any offensive operations other than counterair attack missions are flown. In general terms, **experience has shown that parallel and asymmetric operations are more effective, achieve results faster, and are less costly than symmetric or serial operations.**

**Today, precision engagement and increased intelligence capabilities allow simultaneous and rapid attack on key nodes and forces, producing a cumulative effect that overwhelms the enemy's capacity to recover.** As a result, the effects of parallel operations are achieved quickly and are likely to be decisive. In addition to the physical destruction from parallel operations, the shock and surprise of such attacks, coupled with the uncertainty of when or where the next blow will fall, can lead to serious morale effects on the enemy. Commanders should consider these facts when deciding how best to employ aerospace power at the theater level.

**Parallel operations can be conducted in conjunction with other elements of a joint force.** For

example, counterland operations, in conjunction with simultaneous and coordinated attack by surface forces, can overwhelm an enemy's reinforcement and resupply capacity, creating synergistic effects that have an adverse impact throughout the enemy system. In this case, the surface and aerospace maneuver elements of the joint force are working in conjunction with each other, rather than one in support of another, to achieve decisive results.

Asymmetric force strategy leverages sophisticated military capabilities to rapidly achieve objectives. This strategy, executed in parallel with other aerospace and surface operations, attacks the enemy's centers of gravity. Asymmetric warfare pits our strengths against the adversary's weaknesses and maximizes our capabilities while minimizing those of our enemy to achieve rapid, decisive effects.

**When employed in an independent role, aerospace forces conduct operations aimed directly at accomplishing the theater commander's objectives.** These types of operations may not rely on concurrent surface operations to be effective, nor are they directly affected by the geographical disposition of friendly surface forces. Instead, they are planned to achieve dominant and decisive theater-level



**Just as aerospace forces are not solely employed independently of ground and naval operations, parallel and asymmetric operations are not solely aerospace power concepts. When used in this context, aerospace power provides tremendous leverage to the joint force by broadening options against an adversary through time, distance, and space.**

effects by striking directly at enemy centers of gravity, which may include fielded forces. Such operations are planned to disrupt the enemy's overall strategy or degrade the enemy's ability and will to fight. These operations are defined not by mission types or weapon systems but by the objectives sought. In some situations decisive operations can be conducted globally, reducing or even negating the requirement for the forward deployment of friendly forces.

## CONFLICT TERMINATION


Conflict termination is a vital aspect of tying military actions to strategic objectives, establishing a "better state of peace," and ensuring long term US national objectives are met. **Cessation of hostilities will usually follow one of three patterns.** The first is the **victor imposing its will** on the vanquished by force or other means. The unconditional surrender of the Axis powers ending World War II is one example. Another method may be through a **mutual, negotiated settlement** between the parties involved, such as the negotiations between US and North Vietnamese representatives that ended US military involvement in the war in Vietnam. Finally, **a settlement may be imposed or brought about by a third power.** NATO's intervention in the Bosnian civil war resulted in the Dayton Accords, which ended the conflict. The end of conflict is rarely predictable or even final. For example, the harsh penalties placed on Germany after World War I produced conditions that led to World War II. Termination of the war (or conflict) on terms that allow the nation to meet its desired political goals is the ultimate objective of the military commander.

**The theater commander's strategy should ultimately result in the desired military end state.** Citing Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*:



*I had spent two tours in a war that seemed endless and often pointless. Warfare is such an all-absorbing enterprise ... that after starting one, a government may lose sight of ending it .... I thought that the people responsible should start thinking about how it should end.*

**General Colin Powell**  
**Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff**



**Figure 1.2. Continuum of Conflict**

The desired end state should be clearly described by the NCA before the Armed Forces of the United States are committed to an action. **An end state is the set of required conditions that achieve the strategic objectives.** There may be a preliminary end state—described by a set of military conditions—when military force is no longer the principal means to the strategic aim. There may also be a broader end state that typically involves returning to a state of peace and stability, and may include a variety of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military conditions.

Termination planning should establish the conditions and detail the actions needed to attain the chosen national security goals and objectives. Also, the way a conflict is conducted may have a great effect on the actual end state achieved. For example, unnecessarily aggressive operations may foster ill feelings from the populace, may aggravate refugee problems, or may collaterally damage or destroy so much infrastructure that recovery is more difficult.

**Termination planning should begin as early in the conflict as possible, preferably prior to the beginning of a conflict.** Historically, this has rarely been done. Termination planning is extremely difficult as the conflict can evolve in many directions, forcing a revision of the original termination plan and, in some cases, a change in definition of the end state. **The greatest difficulty at the operational level is translating national goals into quantifiable military objectives that create the conditions needed to achieve the desired end state.**

**Regardless of how termination comes about, operational concerns should be addressed early in the termination effort to avoid resumption of combat.** Provision for the security of remaining forces, responsibilities toward the civilian population, prisoner of war accounting and repatriation are all issues that need to be addressed during the termination phase. *Providing for the security of former adversaries and other basic human needs will significantly enhance peaceful resolution of the conflict. Establishing rules of engagement and targeting criteria, intelligence and other information operations, media, psychological operations, funding, force structure, medical care, and coordination with nonmilitary organizations are key considerations* for friendly forces to better understand their role. These considerations may lead to expanded or increasingly constrained postures to preclude the resurgence of hostilities, enhance public support, and ensure the security of military operations. The influence of nonmilitary instruments of national power will increase as termination approaches and is achieved. Consideration of the requirements for the other instruments of national power will significantly support achieving desired objectives.

Aerospace power can be instrumental to success in this phase of operations. Aerospace forces can assist in locating and removing unexploded ordnance. They can help locate pockets of enemy resistance and, if necessary, neutralize the threat. The same information gained during the combat research phase of campaign planning can be used to identify those social, economic, political, and cultural factors that may require posthostilities attention. This data, combined with the intelligence gathered during the conflict, can be used to identify and apply required national assistance or military influence to stabilize the postconflict environment. Aerospace forces can provide intelligence, airlift, and humanitarian assistance; help restore basic infrastructure; provide transportation, communications, and information support; and provide other assistance required by military, international, regional, and private organizations. Aerospace forces can directly support treaty compliance and verification. Military operations may vary from establishing a

military government (e.g., post-World War II Japan), conducting civil affairs (e.g., post-JUST CAUSE in Panama), performing aerial occupation (e.g., no-fly zones in Iraq), conducting humanitarian operations (e.g., PROVIDE COMFORT in Turkey), to cooperating with a myriad governmental and nongovernmental organizations. The nature of the operation and the required military support will be decided by the objectives of the NCA. Finally, the redeployment of forces should be planned to provide for an orderly, well-defended withdrawal once the required objectives are met.

Whether conflict termination is imposed by decisive military victory or through a negotiated settlement, aerospace forces play a critical role in any posthostility transition as they offer global and theaterwide capabilities. Since aerospace forces offer national leaders a potent force to support political and economic instruments of national power during posthostilities, COMAFFORs must clearly and explicitly define the capabilities of their respective forces to meet the objectives of conflict termination.

## **THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF AEROSPACE POWER**

The specific tasks involved in any given aerospace operation will vary greatly, depending on the detailed context of the larger conflict or contingency, national policies and objectives, forces available to do the job, and a host of other considerations. The following discussion illustrates how aerospace power may be employed under varying circumstances, ranging from peacetime engagement and crisis response, to deterrence and contingency actions, to war-winning actions. The examples are not an exhaustive list but represent a fairly wide spectrum of potential aerospace power tasks.

### **Peacetime Engagement and Crisis Response**

**Peacetime engagement anchors aerospace power to the basic objectives of the *National Security Strategy*—protecting the nation and its vital interests.** A key aim of this strategy is the promotion of long-term international stability. Stability, in turn, establishes conditions necessary for promoting continued democratic development worldwide. Such development is fostered by maintaining permanent overseas presence, participating in combined and joint exercises, conducting aviation advisory assistance, and working with allies on security arrangements. Information systems provide timely and vital warning and monitoring of potential crises through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Aerospace power provides a national response for

safeguarding human life through evacuation, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, or peacekeeping reinforcement when aggression or natural disasters cause physical destruction, privation, or hardship.

**Examples of peacetime engagement and crisis response actions include:**

⦿ **Military-to-Military Contacts:** Military-to-military contacts are direct interactions between US forces and forces of friends and allies specifically designed to enhance mutual trust and interoperability. These include personnel exchange and liaison programs in which select personnel are assigned to foreign operational units and military schools and security assistance programs in which US military personnel provide training to foreign military personnel.

⦿ **Unilateral and Multilateral Exercises:**

Unilateral and multilateral exercises are conducted either through the auspices of a single Service or a joint or multinational event. These exercises reinforce the lessons of training and help identify problems in operations, command and control, and combat

support. Exercises with allied partners also help identify potential problems with access, interoperability, and infrastructure in the host countries. In today's joint environment, truly unilateral exercises are rare, since most exercises involve some degree of joint participation, however small. An example of a multilateral exercise is COPE TIGER, an annual exercise with air force units from Thailand and Singapore, with US Air Force and US Marine Corps participation.

⦿ **Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operations:** These operations are conducted to alleviate natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or result in great damage. (Generally, "humanitarian assistance" applies to such opera-



**Figure 1.3. Peacetime Engagement and Crisis Response**

tions external to the US, while “disaster relief” occurs within the US.) These operations may supplement or complement the logistics efforts of civil authorities who may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance and frequently take the form of transport, supply, and distribution.

This was the case in

Joint Task Force Andrew when 21,000 tons of material and food were airlifted in by 1,014 air sorties to southern Florida after Hurricane Andrew struck in 1992. Another example is Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, which furnished Kurdish refugees food, water, relief centers, and medical assistance after they fled Iraqi forces in northern Iraq.



**In 1948 the Berlin Airlift overcame the Berlin blockade. The effort kept more than two million Berliners alive through a harsh European winter.**

❖ **Arms Control Operations:** Arms control operations limit and reduce the number and types of weapons threatening stability within a region. They encompass arms control verification that entails collecting, processing, and reporting of data indicating testing or employment of proscribed weapon systems, including country of origin and location, weapon and payload identification, and event type. The Open Skies Treaty, signed by 27 nations in 1992, allows overflight verification of each country's conventional military posture and confirms that signatory nations are in compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.

❖ **Counterdrug Operations:** Counterdrug operations are those active measures taken in close cooperation with law enforcement agencies to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Military aerospace and intelligence operations continue to aid law enforcement agencies by providing surveillance, notification, and assistance in apprehending drug traffickers attempting to penetrate US borders.

### ❖ Counterterrorism Operations:

Counterterrorism operations are programs designed to detect, prevent, or neutralize terrorist activities by identifying, targeting, and repressing individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or suspected of conducting terrorist activities. In 1986, Operation EL DORADO CANYON included air strikes against terrorist sites and encampments within Libya to dissuade Muammar Qaddafi from supporting international terrorism.



**In April 1986, joint air forces, including US Air Force F-111s, conducted a raid into Libya, striking a successful blow at international terrorism.**

### ❖ Rescue/Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO):

Aerospace power has often been used to mount rescue operations in crisis situations. Such operations generally involve employing vulnerable aircraft over or within hostile territory, thus entailing high risks. Accordingly, rescue/NEO operations require careful planning and execution. The evacuation of 281 civilians from the US Embassy in Somalia during January 1991 represents a successful operation. The failed attempt in April 1980 to rescue American hostages held in Iran demonstrates the risks involved with poor planning, coordination, and command and control structures.

## Deterrence and Contingency Actions

**Aerospace power provides the nation with a rapid and responsive global force to deter aggression or prevent conflicts from escalating to higher levels of aggression.** Aerospace forces provide both attack capability and support to deterrence through the potential use of overwhelming force. Information assets provide monitoring and warning of potential threats through such capabilities as standoff airborne and overhead reconnaissance and missile launch warning. These capabilities, and the knowledge by a potential aggressor that we have such capabilities, are vital to deterrence. All facets of aerospace power may come into play during contingency actions, which can vary from maintaining an existing peace to intervening in an active conflict to impose peace on warring factions.

Examples of deterrence and contingency actions include:

❖ **Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR):** The evolution of air, space, and information technologies offers a new operational horizon from which military forces can increase situation awareness, tailor operations tempo, gain

and maintain information superiority, and improve overall responsiveness and effectiveness. ISR assets run the gamut from air- and space-borne platforms to special operations teams performing ground-based reconnaissance. The employment of surveillance and reconnaissance assets can also help deter a potential aggressor by letting them know the United States is interested and watching closely. In practice, confronting potential aggressors, either directly or indirectly, with facts about their monitored actions, may serve to diffuse a situation. In 1941, the mismanagement of available ISR resources and the lack of a centralized control activity in Hawaii contributed to the destruction of the battleships of the US Pacific Fleet and the air defense of Hawaii. Conversely, advancements in ISR technology provided early and accurate assessments of Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba in 1962, allowing prompt US reaction and averting a potentially serious threat to US security.

❖ **Show of Force:** Aerospace power often is the only instrument of military power with the speed to respond globally to demonstrate US resolve. Through the increased visibility of United States combat power on short notice, potential conflict can be deterred or a crisis defused. The rapid deployment of an aerospace expeditionary force to Kuwait in 1997 provided a demonstration of rapid combat power and deterred further hostile Iraqi actions.

❖ **Forced Entry:** Aerospace forces play a critical role in establishing conditions necessary for successful introduction of forces into a crisis situation. When crisis response is met with armed opposition, aerospace forces can seize air superiority to allow the introduction of ground or naval forces or inject aerospace power directly to restore stability. Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama during 1989 saw forced entry airpower



**Figure 1.4. Deterrence and Contingency Actions**



**US Air Force aircraft, such as these F-15s, can perform aerial denial as in Operations SOUTHERN and NORTHERN WATCH.**

delivering surface forces to restore stability. This operation demonstrated the use of aerospace power for coercion using lethal force.

❖ **Aerial Denial:** Through presence and responsiveness, aerospace forces are employed to prevent hostile forces from operating effectively within specific areas. The fusion of information from aerospace systems provides a heightened awareness of hostile activity. Responsiveness, coupled with the increased situation awareness from air- and space-based reconnaissance capabilities, enhances the ability to conduct aerial denial. Aerospace power can deter hostile action without the need to be constantly present overhead, as long as all sides understand the capability to rapidly respond is there. Aerial denial is not the same as ground occupation; it provides a different degree of intrusive presence with a smaller investment in personnel and materiel and thus provides the NCA with another military option. The no-fly zones established over Iraq following the Gulf War, Operations SOUTHERN WATCH and NORTHERN WATCH, demonstrate aerial denial operations to coerce and deter.

❖ **Raids:** Aerospace power provides for the rapid projection of combat power into hostile territory to secure information, to confuse the enemy, or to attack hostile targets. Usually of a small scale, aerospace power raids are conducted to achieve operational or strategic effects. Operation BABYLON, the 1981 Israeli air strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak, is an example of a raid.

❖ **Coercion:** Aerospace power can be decisive in both deterring an enemy from performing an action counter to US interests or in compelling an enemy who is already performing such an action to cease and desist. US aerospace power's recognized ability to rapidly and decisively strike at global distances enhances our deterrence capability, as potential threats to our interests at home and abroad must consider all possible consequences of hostile activity. Nonlethal

coercion relies either on nonlethal instruments of aerospace power, or the implied use of lethal means, to “face down” the aggressor without actual combat operations. Lethal coercion employs combat power to punish an aggressor, demonstrate the risk of further aggression, deny the enemy the capability of further aggression, or incapacitate the aggressor’s military forces. In 1995, Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, coupled with the Croatian ground offensive, succeeded in convincing the recalcitrant Bosnian Serbs to remove their heavy weapons from designated exclusion zones and eventually forced them to return to the negotiating table.

❸ **Air Siege:** Air siege operations coerce or compel the enemy towards accepting our desired endstate. Throughout the history of aerial warfare, airpower theorists have offered the potential to fulfill the object of war without requiring costly surface battles of attrition. The United States’ asymmetrical advantage in coupling battlespace awareness and precision guided munitions now allows aerospace power to achieve tactical battlespace effects equal to ground maneuver. **By employing coercive mechanisms such as denial, punishment, risk, and decapitation with a theater perspective, air siege operations isolate the enemy; deny the enemy freedom of movement; deny the enemy organic essentials; disrupt, disable, and destroy the enemy’s command and control; and punish the enemy through the destruction of key centers of gravity.** Siege operations may be active or passive; naval blockades and economic sanctions represent *passive* siege measures while air siege operations represent *active* siege measures. Air sieges characterize air-centric joint campaigns. Air siege operations may be an incremental phase after a halt operation or a prelude to expanding the conflict towards including surface or maritime operations. Operation ALLIED FORCE is a recent example of air siege operations.

### War-Winning Actions

Should deterrence measures fail and a crisis deteriorates into armed conflict, **aerospace power makes a decisive contribution to successful military operations and the attainment of rapid and low cost victory.** War winning is the most important of the tasks assigned to military power, as more vital national interests (or even national survival) are at stake than with smaller contingencies. Conversely, the US military is more often involved in contingency operations than in wars, so our experience base with large-scale war tends to become dated. The actions listed below may also occur during smaller contingencies, or forces may

THE GAINING OF AIR SUPERIORITY IS THE FIRST REQUIREMENT FOR THE SUCCESS OF ANY MAJOR LAND OPERATION. AIR FORCES MAY BE PROPERLY AND PROFITABLY EMPLOYED AGAINST ENEMY SEA POWER, LAND POWER, AND AIR POWER. HOWEVER, LAND FORCES OPERATING WITHOUT AIR SUPERIORITY MUST TAKE SUCH EXTENSIVE SECURITY MEASURES AGAINST HOSTILE AIR ATTACK THAT THEIR MOBILITY AND ABILITY TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY LAND FORCES ARE GREATLY REDUCED.

*[Capitalization in original]*

Field Manual 100-20  
*Command and Employment of Air Power, 1943*

be deployed with the potential to perform these actions should the contingency operation deteriorate into open warfare. During war, these become the high priority functions for aerospace power. These actions are not platform-specific but are often accomplished by multiple types of aerospace assets, as well as by special operations forces (SOF).

Air superiority is a prerequisite for all other combat operations. Attaining air superiority provides both the freedom *to* attack and freedom *from* attack, as well as ensuring freedom to maneuver. In most cases it is the decisive factor in gaining the necessary force protection for military operations. Air superiority can be localized (e.g., protection of high value assets) or theaterwide as it was during DESERT STORM. It includes both offensive and defensive missions and involves the destruction of enemy aircraft and ballistic and cruise missiles, both in flight and on the ground. Offensive counterair is the preferred method, allowing us to choose the time and place of the attack, thus retaining the initiative. The JFACC normally is the area air defense commander (AADC) and is charged with integrating joint offensive and defensive counterair operations to achieve air superiority for the JFC.

Also, securing control of, and access to, the space environment is an increasingly vital function. Defensive counterspace operations involve securing our own space assets from attack through such methods as hardening, maneuver, and dispersal and include defending vital ground nodes as well as spacecraft in orbit. Offensive counterspace operations, using assets from all our military components, deny and disrupt the

enemy's access to space and space-derived information through attacks on spacelift and information infrastructure. Direct attack of enemy spacecraft, should such a capability ever be developed, would also be included in the counterspace function. Counterspace is enhanced by our ability to perform space surveillance, which can cover the spectrum from tracking orbital space debris to following the maneuvers of an enemy antisatellite weapon.

**Examples of war-winning actions include:**

**• Destruction:**

Aerospace power's most obvious wartime force application is the destruction of targets. Its objective is to create maximum, long-term damage the enemy cannot recover from in the immediate future or for the duration of the conflict. It can, for example, mean the destruction of enemy electrical power generating capability by targeting main generators, hydroelectrical facilities, etc. Destruction of the enemy's COGs can result in severe, long-lasting reduction of their combat power, as well as influencing their morale. Such targets include, but are not limited to, high-level command and control facilities and networks, industry, power generation, transportation networks, and military forces. Destruction of military forces in the field can be accomplished by aerospace power acting alone or in joint operations with other components. Destruction of critical targets can also lead to several other effects such as disruption, diversion, or delay of enemy forces. These effects often work to maximum benefit when synchronized with ground maneuver. Modern precision, coupled with the flexibility of aerospace power, often allows destruction through focused combat power without having to physically mass forces over the target. DESERT STORM is an excellent example.

**• Disruption:** The ability of aerospace power to disrupt the enemy is vital. Its objective is temporary incapacitation, preventing an enemy



**Figure 1.5. War-Winning Actions**

*We have the enemy surrounded. We are dug in and have overwhelming numbers. But enemy airpower is mauling us badly. We will have to withdraw.*

**A Japanese infantry commander's situation report to headquarters  
Burma, World War II**

from deploying resources or capabilities for a limited amount of time. It can be the disruption of enemy electrical power generating capability by targeting transformers, power lines, or electrical switching stations. Disruption causes delays, disorder, and confusion and destroys unit cohesion. It makes the enemy far more vulnerable to follow-on attacks by all types of forces. For example, in June-July 1944 the German army, moving to contain the Allied landing in Normandy, was subjected to continuous Allied air interdiction attacks. Many German units suffered significant attrition and some lost unit cohesion to the point of battlefield ineffectiveness. Attacking enemy command and control facilities could also lead to disruption of the enemy's ability to control his forces or to gain intelligence about our own operations. In DESERT STORM, coalition destruction of the Iraqi command and control nets rendered lower echelon Iraqi units leaderless.

➊ **Diversion:** Aerospace power is used to divert enemy forces or divert other resources from supporting the main war effort. Diversion is achieved by concentrating attacks against sensitive targets or by compelling an enemy to reroute forces and resources from offensive to defensive duties. It can be either direct or indirect attack on advancing or retreating enemy forces to change their direction of movement or to force them into or out of a specified area. For example, during World War II the strategic bombing campaign forced the Germans to divert an estimated ten thousand artillery pieces and almost one million troops, which were badly needed by their land forces, into their antiaircraft artillery force for defense of the homeland. At the operational and tactical levels, aerospace power achieves diversion by selectively attacking chokepoints such as bridges or port facilities. Aerospace power can selectively attack enemy forces to channelize them, either for optimizing their vulnerability to further air attack or to position them for attack by our own surface forces.

❖ **Delay:** The effects of dislocation, destruction, and diversion create delays. Aerospace power is used to impose delays on the enemy to allow friendly forces to deal more effectively with an attack or to aid friendly forces in shaping the battlefield. It can be either direct or indirect attack on advancing or retreating enemy forces to slow or temporarily stop their movement. Delay of enemy forces may be accomplished by destroying critical transportation choke points like bridges and roads or by air-dropping mines. Direct attacks on enemy forces may be necessary if transportation choke points are not available. An excellent example of operational delay occurred in the fall of 1950, when air interdiction significantly lengthened the time it took for North Korean reinforcements to reach the Pusan perimeter. This delay helped the embattled defenders to stop the enemy advance, allowing them to hold on to the peninsula while allied forces counter-attacked at Inchon.

❖ **Deception:** Aerospace power conducts actions to deliberately mislead enemy military decision makers about friendly capabilities, intentions, and operations. Deception causes the enemy to react in a way that contributes to successful accomplishment of our overall mission. An excellent example of tactical deception was Operation BOLO, which occurred in 1966 during the Vietnam War. In this ruse, US Air Force fighter pilots flew air-to-air F-4s into North Vietnam but mimicked air-to-ground F-105 formations and used F-105 radio call signs. North Vietnamese MiG fighters, which were effectively in sanctuary while on their airfields, took the bait and were lured out to attack. The operation resulted in the downing of seven MiGs in twelve minutes with no American losses. Thus stung, the North Vietnamese grounded their fighters for a period of time afterwards.

❖ **Halt:** Through the combination of destruction, disruption, diversion, delay, and deception, aerospace power is capable of denying an enemy the ability to offensively employ his forces. This result may occur through aerospace power acting alone or in conjunction with surface operations. Today's modern technology provides the capability to employ precision aerospace power attacks to rapidly halt major enemy advances, well short of enemy objectives. This puts the enemy on the defensive and opens up additional options for the NCA and theater CINC, including the option of an eventual ground counteroffensive, if necessary. It can be direct attack on advancing or retreating enemy forces to prevent further movement. Halting enemy forces

means preventing any movement of enemy forces. Disruption of transportation and or communications networks, as well as direct attack on enemy forces, will be employed. An example of an air-to-surface holding action occurred during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Caught off guard, the Israelis used airpower to contain the Syrian Army's offensive until Israeli ground forces generated sufficient strength to respond effectively. In this case, airpower was the only means available to avoid a major military and political disaster.

❖ **Deployment and Sustainment:** The ability to deploy and sustain aerospace power is key to its successful application as an expeditionary force. The lack of deployment and sustainment capabilities may force a commander to constrict, interrupt, delay, or even cancel operations. This function includes such varied tasks as inter- and intratheater airlift, aerial refueling, spacelift, satellite control, force protection, and infrastructure support. Failure to manage deployment and sustainment operations properly may well lead to defeat. During the North African Campaign of World War II, Allied air interdiction decisively prevented German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel from obtaining reinforcements and logically sustaining his forces, directly contributing in large measure to his overall defeat.

#### ❖ **Information Operations:**

❖❖ **Information-in-Warfare (IIW) (Surveillance and Reconnaissance):** Aerospace surveillance and reconnaissance provide the information required to formulate strategy, develop plans, and conduct operations. These assets perform such tasks as target location and identification, tracking ground and airborne objects, missile launch warning, and other vital functions. During Operation DESERT STORM, the Iraqis' complete lack of reconnaissance and surveillance capability prevented them from reacting effectively to coalition initiatives. By contrast, the coalition maintained near-total situation awareness.

❖❖ **Information Warfare (IW):** Information warfare involves such diverse activities as psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception, electronic combat, both physical and information (cyber) attack, and a variety of defensive activities and programs. For example, in DESERT STORM, Iraqi air defenses were totally blinded within the initial hours of the campaign by electronic warfare and physical destruction of their command and control nodes.



## CHAPTER TWO

# THE TRANSITION FROM PEACE TO CONFLICT



*Anyone who has to fight, even with the most modern weapons, against an enemy in complete command of the air, fights like a savage against modern European troops, under the same handicaps and with the same chances of success.*

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

War has always been a complex undertaking; especially so in modern war. **To ensure an orderly transition from peace to war, and to ensure orderly deployment and employment of American forces, theater and functional CINCs use an extensive planning process** having two sides: deliberate planning and crisis action planning. The resulting plans, backed with identified forces and deployment schedules and implemented through a series of universally understood orders, provide the mechanism for bringing together the resources, equipment, and personnel needed in a military response.

The deliberate and crisis action planning and execution processes have been, for many years, driven by processes outlined in joint publications, most notably by the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). Therefore, there are very few separate Air Force procedures for this process beyond some internal US Air Force major command (MAJCOM) procedures. The purpose of the following discussion is to illustrate the linkage between the products of planning and how they affect US Air Force leaders and forces in the field.


## DELIBERATE VERSUS CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

**During peacetime, theater planners use deliberate planning procedures to evaluate specific situations and plan the military response.** Planners use scenarios and threats identified in national guidance (especially the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan), as well as the CINC's

evaluation of the assigned regional area of responsibility (AOR), to develop a series of plans that span a wide range of operations. This formal process develops responses to potential crises, determines forces required to achieve objectives, prepares deployment plans, and continuously evaluates selected courses of action (COAs).

This lengthy process results in a series of formal plans within each theater, and herein lies a key value of this process: these final plans contain lists of apportioned forces and their time-phased deployment schedules. These forces and detailed deployment schedules may provide the basis for plans needed in crisis action planning.

**Crisis action procedures are used in time-sensitive situations to plan for military action.** Here, the situation is dynamic, and time for planning may be limited to a matter of days. An adequate and appropriate military response in a crisis demands flexible procedures keyed to the time available, rapid and effective communications, and use of previous planning and detailed databases and region analyses whenever possible. See figure 2.1.



**Figure 2.1. Comparing Crisis Action Planning Procedures with Deliberate Planning Procedures** (Source: *Joint Pub 5-0*)

## THE CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PROCESS

As a crisis develops, the theater commander provides an assessment to the National Military Command Center. The most common reports are the Critical Intelligence Report and the ***Operations Report-3*** PINNACLE (OPREP-3P). Appendix A contains a sample OPREP. An OPREP-3 should contain the following:

- ❖ Information on the current situation.
- ❖ Action being taken within the constraints of the commander's current rules of engagement (ROE).
- ❖ Forces that are readily available.
- ❖ Time frame for the earliest commitment of forces.
- ❖ Major constraints, if any, on the employment of forces.

With the decision of the NCA to develop military options, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) issues a ***warning order*** (see appendix B), which should:

- ❖ Describe the situation.
- ❖ Establish command relationships.
- ❖ State the mission, objectives, and assumptions.
- ❖ Refer to applicable operation plans (OPLANs) and operation plans in concept format (CONPLANS).
- ❖ Allocate forces and transportation assets or request that the CINC identify resource requirements.
- ❖ Establish tentative key timing points (e.g., C-day, L-hour) or solicit the CINC's recommendation.
- ❖ Identify the anticipated D-day for planning purposes.
- ❖ Discuss guidance for administrative, logistics, public affairs, civil affairs, and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence subjects.

The NCA will task a geographic or functional CINC who becomes the supported CINC. Depending on the operation, the supported CINC may establish a joint task force (JTF) to accomplish the mission. US Air Force interaction with a JTF may take several forms, depending on whether they are internal or external to the JTF.

- ❖ Within a JTF, US Air Force elements will normally be presented to the supported CINC as a task-oriented, tailored organization called an ASETF under the command of a COMAFFOR.
- ❖ External to a JTF, US Air Force elements will provide support but normally remain under the control of their parent MAJCOM.

**The command relationships and the precise degree of control** (what the gaining commander will exercise and the losing commander will relinquish) **will be specified in Secretary of Defense (SecDef) memoranda.** Generally, forces will be assigned to, attached to, or in direct support of a JTF.

Upon receipt of the warning order, or sooner, the CINC convenes his battle staff or crisis action team, and starts structuring a JTF. **The CINC's supporting Service and functional component commanders usually augment the CINC's staff to develop COAs as recommended military responses to the developing crisis.** US Air Force planners from the designated supporting numbered air force (NAF) may be tasked at this time to augment the CINC's planning team. The supporting MAJCOM will consult with the tasked NAF to ensure qualified planners and liaisons are tasked to augment the CINC's staff while the US Air Force component and JFACC staffs retain the right manning balance.

**At about this time, the standing US Air Force component commander will designate a COMAFFOR to lead the US Air Force element of the JTF.** MAJCOMs acting as a warfighting CINC's US Air Force component will designate a subordinate NAF as the CINC's wartime US Air Force component. *The COMAFFOR's task at this time is to advise the CINC or JFC on the best employment of aerospace power in developing COAs.* Some special notes:

- ❖ If aviation assets of more than one Service are to be employed, the JFC normally will appoint a JFACC from the Service that has the preponderance of the assets and the capability to command them.
- ❖ If the military response is "air-centric," such as an air attack or a humanitarian airlift operation, the JFC could be a US Air Force officer.
- ❖ If the operation is sufficiently large, and composed primarily of US Air Force assets, the NAF commander or even the US Air Force regional MAJCOM commander might be designated the JFC.

Upon receipt and review of the CINC's COAs, the NCA select one. Prior to COA selection, the CINC may receive a CJCS **planning order** (sample at appendix C) to compress execution planning. A planning order does **not** replace formal NCA approval of a COA. The planning order should:

- ❖ Identify forces and resources for planning.
- ❖ Define the objectives, tasks, and constraints.
- ❖ Contain further planning guidance by the Joint Staff.
- ❖ Give a deadline for submitting the operation order (OPORD).

Once the NCA select a course of action, the CJCS publishes an *alert order* (see appendix D). This communicates the NCA decision to develop a detailed military response to the crisis. The contents are similar in format to the planning order, except the operation description clearly states the message is an alert order and execution planning for the selected COA has been authorized. The contents of an alert order may vary; sections may be deleted if the information has already been published.

Execution planning is the detailed planning necessary to execute the selected COA. The actual forces, sustainment, and strategic transportation resources are identified, and the concept of operations is described in an *OPORD* that coordinates the execution of military action (see appendix E). **Based on the JFC's guidance and intent, the component commanders begin their respective detailed planning. For the COMAFFOR, this means providing inputs for developing the Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP).** The process behind JAOP development is explained in chapter six.

Once an NCA decision has been made to commence the operation, the CJCS transmits an *execute order* (see appendix F) directing the CINC to carry out the military action. The issuance of an execute order is time-sensitive. The format may vary; however, information previously provided in the warning, planning, or alert orders will not be repeated. Upon receiving this order, the JTF elements execute their assigned missions.

The broad outline of all information provided by the sum of all the orders should provide the following total picture:

- ❖ Reference.
- ❖ Narrative.
- ❖ Authority.
- ❖ Situation.
- ❖ Mission—a refined statement of tasks and purpose.
- ❖ Execution—course of action, allocation of combat forces, coordinating instructions, C-day and D-day, expected duration, ROE, PSYOP guidance,

deployability status, operations security (OPSEC), deception guidance, etc.

- ❖ Administration and Logistics—allocation of intertheater lift, load planning, logistics factors, public affairs guidance, etc.
- ❖ Command and Signal—communications guidance, command relationships, and signal.

## **OTHER FORCE GENERATION CONSIDERATIONS**

### **Reserve Component Mobilization**

The US Air Force has a substantial part of its forces in the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard. These forces may be made available during the planning process by the NCA. While they may seamlessly operate alongside the active US Air Force, they are subject to different levels of activation and different degrees of operational and administrative control (these types of control—operational control (OPCON) and administrative control (ADCON)—are discussed in more detail in chapters three and four). The four levels of activation are:

- ❖ Volunteerism: The Secretary of the Air Force is allowed to place the Selected Reserve on active duty with no time limit.
- ❖ Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up: The President can authorize up to 200,000 members for up to 270 days.
- ❖ Partial Mobilization: In time of a national emergency declared by the President, or when otherwise authorized by law, up to 1 million reserve members may be involuntarily activated for not more than 24 consecutive months.
- ❖ Full Mobilization: In time of war or a national emergency declared by Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law, all reserves may be activated for the duration of the war or emergency and for 6 months thereafter.

For a more complete description of the levels of Reserve activation and OPCON and ADCON relationships with the COMAFFOR, see appendix G.

### **The Civil Reserve Air Fleet**

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is a unique and significant part of the nation's mobility resources that may be activated to support the movement of forces into a theater. Selected civil aircraft from US airlines, contractually

committed to CRAF support Department of Defense (DOD) airlift requirements in emergencies when the airlift need exceeds the capability of military aircraft. Airlines contractually pledge aircraft to the various CRAF segments and are ready for activation when needed. To provide incentives for civil carriers to commit these aircraft to the CRAF program and to assure the United States of adequate airlift reserves, Air Mobility Command (AMC) awards peacetime airlift contracts to civilian airlines that offer aircraft to the CRAF.

Three stages of incremental activation allow for tailoring an airlift force suitable for the contingency at hand. **Stage I** is for **minor regional crises**, **Stage II** for **major regional contingencies**, and **Stage III** for periods of **national mobilization**. The Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command (USCINCTRANS), with approval of the SecDef, is the authority for all three stages of CRAF activation. During a crisis, if AMC has a need for additional aircraft, it may request United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) take steps to activate the appropriate CRAF stage.

Each stage of CRAF activation is only used to the extent necessary to provide the amount of civil augmentation airlift needed by DOD. When notified of call-up, the carrier response time to have its aircraft ready for a CRAF mission is 24 to 48 hours after the mission is assigned by AMC. The air carriers continue to operate and maintain the aircraft with their resources; however, AMC controls the aircraft missions.

## **SUMMARY**

The time and events between the start of a crisis and initiation of a military response vary greatly; many activities will probably be compressed and many processes may run concurrently. However, the detailed attention given during the planning phase is the primary factor that determines success. Two examples of military operations that influenced joint planning reform were Operation EAGLE CLAW, the 1980 Iran hostage rescue attempt, and Operation URGENT FURY, the 1983 operation in Grenada. Although many reasons exist for the difficulties experienced during these two operations, the subsequent passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986 laid the foundation for Operation DESERT STORM's successful joint plan. That joint plan successfully and effectively transitioned US forces from peace to conflict. One of the main reasons the plan was successful was that there was a short, simple, centralized chain of command. The following chapters explain these concepts further.



## CHAPTER THREE

# ORGANIZING US AIR FORCE FORCES

*It turned out to be another scrambled outfit...with so many lines of responsibility, control, and coordination that it resembled a can of worms as you looked at it....*

**Lieutenant General George Kenney's  
initial  
assessment of one of his new commands  
Australia, 1942**



## FUNDAMENTAL COMMAND AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPTS

Two central ideas—the principle of unity of command and the tenet of centralized control and decentralized execution—underpin the way the Air Force organizes. In order to effect this, the US Air Force requires a universally understood organizational structure that can support joint and multinational operations throughout the entire spectrum of conflict. **In any operation, a COMAFFOR is designated** from the US Air Force and serves as the commander of US Air Force forces assigned and attached to the US Air Force component. **US Air Force elements deployed in an expeditionary role are designated as an Aerospace Expeditionary Task Force (AETF).** The COMAFFOR, with the AETF, presents the JFC a task-organized, integrated package with the proper balance of force, sustainment, and force protection elements. The following discussion presents recommendations for organizing and operating US Air Force forces afield. **Commanders should apply sound professional judgment to tailor their organizations and operations for the task at hand and for the requirements within differing theaters.**

For each joint operation, the operational and administrative responsibilities and authorities of the COMAFFOR are established through the operational and administrative chains of command, respectively. The operational chain of command flows from the NCA through the commander of a combatant command (CINC) and, if established, subordinate joint force commander, to the COMAFFOR. The Service administrative chain of command flows from the NCA through the

Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF), Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), MAJCOM, and NAF commanders.

The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) assigns at least one COMAFFOR to each CINC by issuing the “Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum. For example, the Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command’s (USCINCPAC’s) COMAFFOR is the Commander, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). A NAF commander within a MAJCOM assigned to one CINC may serve as the COMAFFOR for another regional CINC. For example, the Ninth Air Force (9 AF) commander acts as COMAFFOR to the Commander in Chief, US Central Command (USCINCCENT). Similarly, the PACAF commander has delegated some authorities to the Seventh Air Force (7 AF) commander who acts as the COMAFFOR to the United States Forces Korea commander.

## **THE AEROSPACE EXPEDITIONARY TASK FORCE**

The ASETF is the designated US Air Force organization to fulfill the JTF and JFACC campaign objectives. An ASETF encompasses all US Air Force forces assigned or attached to the JTF and includes other forces dedicated to the JTF mission provided via reachback. It provides the JFACC with **a single point of contact for US Air Force aerospace force capabilities in a scalable, task-organized, tailored package**. Where appropriate, the functions of an ASETF can be accomplished by an in-place NAF. The ASETF can be sized depending on the level of conflict and the desired political and military objectives. **The command element includes the ASETF commander (the COMAFFOR), a staff, and a command and control function**. Like the force itself, the command element is tailored to the unit(s) and mission.

**The NAF is the senior war-fighting echelon of the US Air Force.** War-fighting NAFs conduct theater aerospace operations with assigned and attached forces through the aerospace operations center (AOC) and train to perform this role as an integral C2 element. Not all NAFs maintain this capability. A NAF conducts operations with assigned and attached forces under a command element. **When participating in a joint operation, the tasked NAF(s) will present US Air Force forces to the JFC within the framework of an ASETF.** When an in-place NAF is tasked to support a JFC, the framework will be the same as an ASETF, but the in-place NAF will retain its NAF designation (e.g., 7 AF). The tasked NAF, for geographic combatant commands, and the COMAFFOR will be designated by the tasked US Air Force component command.

## The Aerospace Expeditionary Task Force

The US Air Force component in a joint force will organize as an Aerospace Expeditionary Task Force (AETF). The AETF is a scalable, tailorabile organization with three components: a single commander, embodied in the COMAFFOR; appropriate command and control mechanisms; and tailored and fully supported forces. The elements of an AETF may be deployed forward into a theater, or some may be available elsewhere in a theater or even in the CONUS, available via reachback.

The AETF may be a fully combat capable numbered air force of wings, groups, and squadrons fighting a major operation with a substantial in-theater presence, as in Operation ALLIED FORCE.



It may be a few squadron elements of combat aircraft, with associated support, as part of a standing operation, as in Operation NORTHERN WATCH.



It may be an air mobility operation delivering food and medical supplies in a relief operation, as in the response to Hurricane Mitch.



An AETF's desired effect might not directly involve aerospace power. After supporting the initial insertion of forces, the US Air Force's main element in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was a medical unit.

When a CINC forms a JTF that includes US Air Force forces, the associated MAJCOM will form an AETF or task an in-place NAF to provide the command framework for all assigned/attached US Air Force forces. The AETF commander or NAF commander will act as the COMAFFOR. The COMAFFOR may be a colonel to major general for an AETF that is subordinate to a NAF; if the NAF itself is tasked, the NAF commander will be the COMAFFOR. **The COMAFFOR should normally be designated at a command level above the operating forces and should**



**Centralized planning and control of aerospace assets are accomplished through the aerospace operations center.**

**not be dual-hatted as commander of one of the subordinate operating units** (e.g., wing commander or group commander). See figure 3.1.

The COMAFFOR's responsibilities, authorities, and command relationships with regard to US Air Force forces, attached to the ASETF/in-place NAF but assigned to one of the functional combatant commanders (USCINCTRANS, Commander in Chief, US Space Command [USCINCSPACE], Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command [USCINCSTRAT], and Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command), are as directed by competent authority through the operational and administrative chains of command. Normally, the COMAFFOR has complete ADCON over assigned forces and specified ADCON over attached forces, regardless of US Air Force component.


## **PRESENTATION OF US AIR FORCE FORCES**

### **The Command Element**

The command element supporting expeditionary operations has three main components: the commander, an appropriately sized staff, and adequate C2 facilities to direct and support the operating forces and interact with the JFC. The C2 mechanism has two faces: the operational and the service.

#### **• The AOC is the operational C2 center for US Air Force forces.**

The AOC will be the senior operations center and focal point for the command and control of aerospace forces in Air Force-only operations. The fundamental principle of this system is centralized planning and control through the AOC, with decentralized execution by subordinate organizations and elements. Note: There should only be one AOC within



**Figure 3.1. Guidelines for Presenting Forces in Echelon**

an area of operations. When the COMAFFOR is also the JFACC, the AOC is called the joint air operations center (JAOC).

- ❸ **The A-staff manages the service authority issues—the “beds, beans, and bullets.”** This activity, functionally separate from the war-fighting activities performed by the AOC, is responsible for a range of support activities such as (but not limited to) logistics, personnel, medical, and security.

The COMAFFOR has complete ADCON over assigned forces and specified ADCON over attached forces, regardless of US Air Force component. However, some force elements or materiel support may also be provided via **“reachback.”** Reachback allows the COMAFFOR to quickly obtain or coordinate support from units that are not physically located with the ASETF or in-place NAF. Reachback, for both additional forces and materiel, is vital to reducing the initial deployment footprint, thus preserving critical lift. In some cases, additional forces can be assigned or attached units, but more often they are provided through a tactical control (TACON) or supported/supporting relationship. **Reachback, however, is not intended to be used to justify individual units bypassing in-place operating procedures to request follow-on assets, supplies, or manpower from their home station.** Where specific reachback forces (e.g., aircraft on alert) can be dedicated to a joint operation, TACON by the COMAFFOR is the preferred relationship. Where specific reachback forces cannot be dedicated to the COMAFFOR, a supported/supporting relationship normally will be established. **Reachback units provide liaison teams as required;** these teams normally work directly for the COMAFFOR.

The parent MAJCOM of the engaged NAF, or the NAF rear, will function as the US Air Force component rear. When a MAJCOM directly provides forces, as the US Air Force component of a supported CINC, it


will act as the component rear. If authorized by the supported CINC, the US Air Force component rear will coordinate with the supporting CINCs and other US Air Force MAJCOMs or agencies on behalf of the COMAFFOR. For example, in Operation DESERT STORM, 9 AF was the engaged NAF as US Central Command Air Forces (USCENTAF), and the Tactical Air Command battle staff functioned as USCENTAF Rear. If staff activities are split between forward and rear locations, the COMAFFOR should outline the division of responsibilities between the forward and rear staffs. The command element will be discussed in greater detail in chapter four.

### **Aerospace Expeditionary Forces**

An aerospace expeditionary force (AEF) is an organizational structure composed of force packages of capabilities that provides warfighting CINCs with rapid and responsive aerospace power. These force packages, together with their support and C2 elements, are tailored to meet specific needs across the spectrum of response options and will deploy within an ASETF as aerospace expeditionary wings (AEWs), groups (AEGs), or squadrons (AESs). **An AEF, by itself, is not a deployable or employable entity.**

### **Aerospace Expeditionary Wing**

An AEW is a deployed wing or a wing slice attached to an ASETF or in-place NAF by G-series orders. The CINC or JFC normally delegates OPCON of an AEW to the COMAFFOR. An AEW normally is composed of the wing command element and several groups. AEWs will carry the numerical



**Figure 3.2. Structure of a Notional Aerospace Expeditionary Wing**


designation of the wing providing the command element. Deployed assigned or attached groups and squadrons will retain their numerical designation and acquire the “expeditionary” designation. Use of the AEW designation is also intended to provide appropriate unit awards and honors credit.

An AEW may be composed of units from different wings, but where possible, the AEW is formed from units of a single wing. The AEW commander will report to the COMAFFOR. Figure 3.2 depicts a notional AEW.

### **Aerospace Expeditionary Group**

An AEG is a deployed independent group attached to an ASETF or in-place NAF by G-series orders and is the lowest command echelon of forces reporting directly to the COMAFFOR. The CINC or JFC normally delegates OPCON of an AEG to the COMAFFOR. An AEG is composed of a slice of the wing command element and some squadrons. Since US Air Force groups are organized without significant staff support, a wing slice is needed to provide the command and control for AEFs smaller than the normal wing. The AEG will carry the numerical designation of the wing or group providing the command element. Deployed assigned or attached squadrons will retain their numerical designation and acquire the “expeditionary” designation. Use of the AEG designation is also intended to provide appropriate unit awards and honors credit for the parent unit.

An AEG may be composed of units from different wings, but where possible, the AEG is formed from units of a single wing. The AEG commander will report to the COMAFFOR. Figure 3.3 depicts a notional AEG.



**Figure 3.3. Structure of a Notional Aerospace Expeditionary Group**

## **Aerospace Expeditionary Squadron**

An AES is a deployed squadron attached to an ASETF by G-series orders. **The squadron is the basic fighting unit of the US Air Force.** Squadrons are configured to deploy and employ in support of crisis action requirements. However, an individual squadron is not designed to conduct independent operations; it requires support from other units to obtain the synergy needed for sustainable, effective operations. As such, **an individual squadron or squadron element should not be presented by itself without provision for appropriate support and command elements.** If a single operational squadron or squadron element is all that is needed to provide the desired operational effect (for example, an element of C-130s performing humanitarian operations), **it should deploy with provision for commensurate support and C2 elements.** The structure of this ASETF would appear similar to an AEG (see figure 3.3). In some operations, not all support and C2 elements need to deploy forward with the operational squadron. Some may be positioned “over the horizon,” constituting capabilities provided through reachback.

A single squadron or squadron element may deploy without full support elements if it is planned to augment a deployed AEW or AEG. It would thus obtain necessary support from the larger units. See figures 3.5 and 3.6.

## **Expeditionary Elements below Squadron Level**

In addition to expeditionary wings, groups, and squadrons, the Air Force can deploy elements below the squadron level for specific, limited functions. These include individuals and specialty teams such as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, security forces, liaison teams, etc. They may deploy independently of other Air Force units, often to remote locations, and may operate directly with other Services. For ADCON purposes, these elements should normally be attached to the commander of a recognizable Air Force entity in the region, either a deployed ASETF, an in-place NAF, or a regional Air Force MAJCOM. Examples of such deployed elements might be a psychological operations team augmenting a Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) or an EOD team augmenting a predominately surface force.

## **Designation of Expeditionary Units**

To confer unit awards and honors, the ASETF will reflect the numerical designation of the tasked NAF. When attached to a joint force, a NAF that is required to deploy to execute its commitment will be designated

the XX ASETF, where XX refers to its NAF numerical designation. When an ASETF is established as a command echelon subordinate to a NAF, that ASETF will be designated using the number of the engaged NAF, then "ASETTF," followed by the name of the operation. For example, an ASETF subordinate to Sixteenth Air Force (16 AF) for Operation DENY FLIGHT would be designated the 16 ASETF—DENY FLIGHT.


Wings, groups, and squadrons are designated "expeditionary" from the time they are attached until no longer attached to an ASETF. Squadrons and dependent groups assigned or attached to an ASETF add "expeditionary" to the designation of the unit; each wing committed to a joint operation is designated as an AEW and each independent group is designated an AEG. Wings, groups, and squadrons that are permanently assigned in-theater, and that are attached or assigned to an ASETF, normally will not add "expeditionary" to their unit designation, because they are not deployed away from their home base. (Note: There may be situations, as when dealing with a coalition or alliance, or for other political concerns, that may require an in-theater based unit to be designated "expeditionary.")

Other deployed wings, groups, and squadrons that are not assigned or attached to the ASETF, but provide significant support (such as airlift and tanker units in the intertheater air bridge or space and special operations units in direct support), may be designated "expeditionary" at the discretion of their owning MAJCOM commander. Normally, these "expeditionary" forces retain their peacetime or global operating chains of command.

### **Multiple AEW Employment**

The ASETF may grow to encompass several wings at geographically separate locations and to encompass the full range of aerospace power. This includes organic sustainment and the capability to plan and execute any operation across the range of military operations from military operations other than war (MOOTW) to a major theater war (MTW). Figure 3.4 illustrates a notional ASETF with several AEWs.


Figure 3.5 is an example of the 9 ASETF—SOUTHERN WATCH as deployed in 1997 to Southwest Asia (SWA). Shown are the 4 AEW (deployed from Seymour Johnson AFB to an in-theater location), the 4404th Composite Wing (Provisional) (already in theater), and the 2 AEW (which operated from its CONUS location at Barksdale AFB and was under TACON to the Commander, 9 ASETF—SOUTHERN WATCH). The 4404 CW(P) received the




**Figure 3.4. Notional Structure for an ASETF with Multiple Aerospace Expeditionary Wings**

deployed 9 Expeditionary Fighter Squadron (EFS) to add to its units already in theater. The 4 AEW added the C-130s of the 39 Expeditionary Airlift Squadron (EAS) from Dyess AFB to their two F-15E squadrons. The 9 ASETF—SOUTHERN WATCH commander (USCENTCOM's JTF SWA) exercised OPCON and ADCON of the forces assigned to 9 ASETF, under the OPCON of the JFC appointed by USCINCCENT, and was under the ADCON of the commander, 9 AF. (Again, the COMAFFOR has complete ADCON of assigned forces and specified ADCON over attached forces, regardless of US Air Force component).

When an in-place (i.e., in-theater) NAF is assigned/attached to a joint operation as the US Air Force component, it will use its NAF numerical designation. For example, 7 AF in Korea would remain 7 AF. Figure 3.6 is an example of the



**Figure 3.5. Example: 9 ASETF—SOUTHERN WATCH**



**Figure 3.6. Example: 7 AF with Expeditionary Forces Attached**

7 AF with four wings (two in-place and two deployed). The diagram shows the 51 Wing (WG) at Osan AB would receive the additional support of the deployed 44 EFS from Kadena AB, Japan, and the 160 EFS (ANG) from Dannelly Field, AL. The 4 AEW, a mixed force from Seymour Johnson AFB and Dyess AFB, would deploy into the theater, as would the 354 AEW from Eielson AFB. The 8 Fighter Wing (FW) would remain in-place at Kunsan AB and receive the additional support of the 303 EFS (AFRC) from Whiteman AFB. Note that the 51 WG and the 8 FW would not be redesignated “expeditionary” since they would be operating from their home stations.

## COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

### Assigning, Attaching, and Supporting

With few exceptions, all Air Force forces are assigned to a combatant commander. Individual CINCs

Operation **PROVIDE COMFORT**, the humanitarian relief effort for Kurds in northern Iraq, provides an example of the different ways command relationships may be established:

- ➊ The NCA designated USCINCEUR as the supported CINC. Subsequently, USCINCEUR-assigned fighter aircraft deployed from Ramstein and Bitburg ABs, Germany, to Incirlik AB, Turkey, supporting the JTF in northern Iraq. USCINCEUR retained full command authority over these forces deployed to support his subordinate JTF.
- ➋ When additional aircraft were needed later to help ease operating tempo, USCINCPAC-assigned fighters from Misawa AB, Japan, were deployed to Incirlik AB, Turkey, and were transferred via **attachment** to USCINCEUR. As part of the transfer, the NCA specified that USCINCPAC would relinquish OPCON of these aircraft to USCINCEUR.
- ➌ USTRANSCOM-assigned aircraft conducting intertheater operations flew relief supplies into the European AOR in **direct support** of USCINCEUR and Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. USCINCTRANS retained full command authority over these intertheater forces operating in a direct support role.

exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) whereas subordinate JFCs normally exercise OPCON over assigned forces. **Assignment is usually a permanent transfer of forces.** The gaining commander exercises full control of assigned forces.

At times, a CINC's requirements may exceed the capabilities of the assigned forces. In such situations, the NCA may elect to transfer forces from a supporting CINC through attachment to a supported CINC. **Attachment is a temporary transfer of forces** between CINCs. Whenever forces attach, the NCA will specify the degree of command authority the gaining commander will exercise and the losing commander will relinquish. Typically, supported CINCs who gain forces through attachment will exercise OPCON or TACON over those forces and normally delegate this authority to their subordinate commanders, as necessary.

**Where neither assignment nor attachment is appropriate, forces may function in direct support of the supported CINC.** A superior commander may establish a support relationship between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. In this case, a supported/supporting relationship is usually established between the supported CINC and the CINC providing direct support forces. At times, the supported CINC may be granted TACON over direct support forces. In all cases, however, the NCA will define applicable command relationships.

### **Command Relationship Models for Air Force Forces**

The deployment order is the primary instrument for transferring forces and establishing supported and supporting relationships between CINCs (Other orders created during the planning process, such as warning, alert, planning, execution, and fragmentary orders, may also specify or shape command relationships, but they do not transfer forces.) The SecDef, as the only authority for transferring OPCON between combatant commanders, normally signs deployment orders. Details for lower levels of command, such as TACON and support, may be worked out at levels below the SecDef. Air Force component commanders, therefore, may shape command and support relationships by working through their chains of command to shape the details of orders being drafted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). While the JFC ultimately has the authority to determine the delegation of command among subordinates, **US Air Force commanders should make consistent recommendations and present forces in a consistent manner to the JFC.**

**For US Air Force forces, there are four general models for command relationship: forces deployed into the theater of operations; forces executing missions inside the theater of operations but based outside the theater (i.e., across AORs); functional forces with global missions; and transient forces.** Considerations for these relationships should include the ability of gaining commands to receive the forces and to command and control them appropriately; the characteristics and support requirements of the forces involved; and the operating locations of the forces. [Note: In the following examples, “supported CINC/JFC” specifically means the in-theater commander who is tasked with executing the operation for which the forces under discussion are assigned or attached.]

**Theater Forces:** In general, when US Air Force forces deploy into a theater to conduct operations, OPCON of those forces should normally go forward to the supported CINC. To the maximum extent possible, specified elements of ADCON should also go forward. ADCON authorities and responsibilities can run concurrently between the gaining COMAFFOR and the parent organizations of the deployed forces (see chapter four for more complete ADCON discussion).

**Cross-AOR Operations:** There are two general cases in which US Air Force forces may execute missions inside a theater of operations while based outside the theater. These cases involve CONUS-based forces and deployed forces based outside the AOR. In either case, operational control of forces should go forward to the commander executing the mission, and ADCON will depend on where the forces are based.

★ **CONUS-Based Forces:** CONUS-based forces that launch from the CONUS, conduct operations in another theater, and recover to CONUS should transfer OPCON to the supported CINC/JFC no later than sortie takeoff. ADCON should remain with the Commander, Air Combat Command (COMACC). An example would be a bomber launching from CONUS, striking a target overseas in support of a regional force, and returning to CONUS. Another example would be bombers placed on alert in CONUS in support of USCINCPAC tasking. For both of these examples, OPCON should go forward to the supported CINC/JFC who is executing the mission; this is the preferred arrangement. However, if a CINC/JFC decides to only exercise TACON of these forces, OPCON remains with the Commander in Chief, US Joint Forces Command (USCINCPAC) and ADCON remains with COMACC.

⌚ **Forward Deployed Outside the AOR:** For units that deploy to a forward location but are stationed outside the theater of operations with the intent of conducting sustained operations in that theater, OPCON should normally go forward to the supported CINC/JFC, and ADCON is best transferred to the COMAFFOR for the geographic region in which they bed down. An example of this situation is bombers stationed at Diego Garcia (in the US Pacific Command's AOR) but conducting operations in support of US Central Command. The Commander in Chief, US Central Command (USCINCCENT) would exercise OPCON of the bombers and the PACAF commander would exercise ADCON.

**Global Functional Forces:** Functional forces (such as mobility and space forces) satisfy mission requirements across multiple AORs and are thus best centrally controlled. For such forces, the functional combatant commander will normally retain OPCON of assigned forces and provide either TACON or a direct support relationship with the supported CINC/JFC. In some cases, OPCON of the forces may go forward to the supported CINC if that supported CINC will fully employ them. As an example, tankers are deployed forward in support of a regional operation. If the tankers are totally committed to that operation and are unavailable to perform any other missions, OPCON of these tankers may go forward to the supported CINC/JFC. If on the other hand the tankers are only partially employed in that operation, and thus are available for other missions, USCINCTRANS should retain OPCON to optimize overall tanker utilization. Similarly, missile warning satellites can provide warning to the supported CINC/JFC through a direct support relationship, but USCINCSpace retains OPCON to optimize missile warning mission requirements globally.

**Transient forces:** OPCON of transient forces (i.e., forces merely transiting an AOR or JOA and not part of an ASETF) does not normally transfer to regional or local commanders. However, they are subject to local force protection and administrative reporting requirements. Per Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, “**Transient forces** within the assigned AOR of a combatant commander **are subject to the area commander's orders in some instances**, e.g., for coordination for emergency defense or allocation of local facilities. However, transient forces **are not part of the area commander's command**, and the area commander is **not in their normal chain of command.**” *[Emphasis in original.]*

## CHAPTER FOUR

# LEADING EXPEDITIONARY AEROSPACE FORCES

**CONTROL OF AVAILABLE AIR POWER MUST BE CENTRALIZED AND COMMAND MUST BE EXERCISED THROUGH THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER IF [ITS] INHERENT FLEXIBILITY AND ABILITY TO DELIVER A DECISIVE BLOW ARE TO BE FULLY EXPLOITED. THEREFORE, THE COMMAND OF AIR AND GROUND FORCES IN A THEATER OF OPERATIONS WILL BE VESTED IN THE SUPERIOR COMMANDER CHARGED WITH THE ACTUAL CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN THE THEATER, WHO WILL EXERCISE COMMAND OF AIR FORCES THROUGH THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER AND COMMAND OF GROUND FORCES THROUGH THE GROUND FORCE COMMANDER.**

*[Capitalization in original]*

**Field Manual 100-20,  
*Command and Employment of Air Power, 1943***

This chapter examines the responsibilities, relationships, and nominal staff organizations of the three key leadership positions within the JTF construct that affect the employment of aerospace power: the JFC, the COMAFFOR, and the JFACC. Each has specific responsibilities and degrees of control over assigned and attached forces. Because airmen may be assigned to any or all of these positions, it is essential they understand these relationships to ensure the proper oversight and employment of aerospace expeditionary forces.

As discussed in chapter two, the ASETF is created during the deliberate or crisis action planning (CAP) processes. The NCA will task a CINC with a mission. The CINC can act as the JFC for this mission or may delegate this authority to a subordinate. The JFC, as the senior commander for the joint force, relies heavily on his or her Service and functional components throughout the deliberate planning and CAP process.

Early in the CAP process, the tasked NAF commander, or a subordinate commander designated by the NAF commander, is provided to the JFC as the COMAFFOR. The CINC's battle staff or crisis action team assists the COMAFFOR/JFACC in developing COAs. The COMAFFOR/JFACC develops COAs and advises the JFC on the best employment of aerospace power. The JFC ultimately translates the CINC's guidance and theater strategy into clearly defined and attainable objectives.


## THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER

The JFC is the commander of a unified command, subunified command, or JTF authorized to exercise operational authority over a joint force to accomplish an assigned mission. **The JFC determines appropriate military objectives and sets priorities for the entire joint force.** The JFC's major responsibilities include:

- ❖ Determine a concept of operations and military objectives for the joint force that will accomplish strategic objectives.
- ❖ Organize forces, define operational/joint areas, and allocate resources to accomplish the mission based on his vision and concept of operations.
- ❖ Assign missions, establish priorities, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders.
- ❖ Develop a theater campaign plan that assures unity of effort and determines the priority of effort to include space forces.
- ❖ Assess risks, make appropriate adjustments, and redirect efforts of subordinate commanders.

The JFC is supported with Service component commands and designates functional component commanders, such as a JFACC, as needed. When established, functional component commanders derive their operational command authority from the JFC. **The JFC normally should not serve as a functional or Service component commander. For example, a US Air Force JFC should not also be the COMAFFOR or the JFACC.** Figure 4.1 depicts a typical JFC organization including both Service and functional components.


The JFC organizes a joint staff to carry out assigned duties and responsibilities. The composition, location, facilities, and personnel manning of the JTF headquarters are critical, because they affect what the JFC and



**Figure 4.1. Possible Components in a Joint Force**

the joint staff can accomplish (e.g., an afloat JTF headquarters may have limitations of space and equipment on certain flag ships, which could affect manning levels and equipment capabilities). The JFC normally creates the staff around a core element from the unified command, subunified command, or one of the Service component staffs. This core element usually requires staff augmentation from all of the Services and other agencies. The tasked NAF or parent MAJCOM normally will augment a JTF staff with US Air Force personnel specifically designated and trained as JTF augmentees. Augmentation requirements that cannot be filled by the engaged NAF or parent MAJCOM will be provided from throughout the US Air Force using normal personnel channels. Figure 4.2 depicts a notional JTF headquarters staff.

In addition to staff augmentation, joint operations have shown that qualified liaison officers (LNOs) distributed laterally between each component contribute significantly to mission success. The COMAFFOR/JFACC should provide a liaison team to the JFC to serve as the direct representative of the COMAFFOR/JFACC and to maintain close contact with the JFC staff to ensure information cross-flow between JFC and COMAFFOR/JFACC staffs.



Source: Joint Pub 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures*, 13 January 1999.

**Figure 4.2. Notional JTF Headquarters Staff Organization**

## THE COMMANDER, AIR FORCE FORCES

**The COMAFFOR provides unity of command, one of the most widely recognized principles of war.** Although the JFC has great latitude in determining command relationships, **the JFC normally delegates OPCON over all assigned and attached US Air Force forces to the COMAFFOR.** However, some US Air Force forces and capabilities (such as intertheater air mobility and space assets) must maintain a global focus, thus preventing the transfer of OPCON to the JFC and COMAFFOR. Where appropriate, the JFC and COMAFFOR should be given TACON over these assets to integrate the additional capabilities they provide to the joint force. TACON transfers may occur vertically within a joint command (USCINCEUR transfers TACON to the JFC) or horizontally across joint commands (USTRANSCOM transfers TACON to USCINCEUR). In both cases, CINCs may authorize their subordinate air component commanders to grant or receive TACON, as long as their CINCs are advised of the disposition of affected forces, and so long as their CINCs ultimately approve the transfer. Where neither OPCON nor TACON of such Air Force forces is appropriate, the JFC (and in turn the COMAFFOR) will receive support capabilities specified by the supported/supporting command relationship. Once the NCA establish broad CINC-to-CINC supported/supporting command relationships (for example, USCINCEUR designated supported CINC and USCINCTRANS designated supporting CINC) for a particular operation, the corresponding Air Force components (in this example, US Air Forces in Europe and AMC) should work directly with each other to further detail the associated support for the COMAFFOR.

In most cases, the COMAFFOR will deploy to a location in the theater, preferably close to the JFC. In mature theaters like Korea, the COMAFFOR staff and the AOC may operate effectively from permanent, in-garrison facilities. In either case, the tasked NAF or the parent MAJCOM functions as the Air Force component rear for 24-hour support of the operation. Also, the tasked NAF is responsible for providing the COMAFFOR and the core of the headquarters A-staff.

**The COMAFFOR has responsibility for overseeing the morale, welfare, safety, and security of assigned forces.** Subordinate commanders will issue orders and direct actions in support of those responsibilities and will ensure these orders and directives are consistent with the policies and directives of the COMAFFOR exercising ADCON of those forces. The responsibilities of parent MAJCOMs and lead commands are to organize, train, equip, and provide forces, though the responsibility of the COMAFFOR

is to ensure specialized training is conducted based on mission needs. The COMAFFOR and properly designated subordinate commanders will exercise disciplinary authority in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and relevant Air Force Instructions (AFIs). These commanders will advise parent MAJCOMs of any disciplinary action taken against deployed personnel.

Commanders of US Air Force components have responsibilities that derive from their roles in fulfilling the Service's ADCON function. Through the JFC's command authority, the JFC normally will conduct operations through the COMAFFOR by delegating OPCON of the Air Force component forces to the COMAFFOR. Through the Service's ADCON authority, **the COMAFFOR will have complete ADCON of all assigned US Air Force forces and specified ADCON of all attached US Air Force forces.** The specified ADCON responsibilities listed below apply to all attached forces, regardless of MAJCOM or US Air Force component (active duty, Guard, or Reserve). Additionally, **intertheater forces, such as intertheater airlift and forces transiting another COMAFFOR's AOR, will be subject to the ADCON authority of the respective COMAFFOR while transiting that COMAFFOR's AOR for only administrative reporting and force protection requirements.** The Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) retain all other ADCON responsibilities, such as Reserve Component activation, inactivation, partial mobilization, and length of tour. Whether the COMAFFOR is delegated OPCON of the Air Force component forces or not, **the COMAFFOR has the following specified ADCON responsibilities:**

- ❖ Make recommendations to the JFC (or the JFACC, if the COMAFFOR is not the JFACC) on the proper employment of the forces of the US Air Force component.
- ❖ Accomplish assigned tasks for operational missions.
- ❖ Nominate specific units of the Air Force for assignment to theater forces. Actual unit and personnel sourcing will follow established US Air Force procedures.
- ❖ Organize, train, equip, and sustain assigned and attached Air Force forces for in-theater missions.
- ❖ Maintain reachback to the US Air Force component rear and supporting Air Force units. Delineate responsibilities between forward and rear staff elements.

- ❖ Support operational and exercise plans as requested.
- ❖ Inform the JFC (and the combatant commander, if affected) of planning for changes in logistics support that would significantly affect operational capability or sustainability sufficiently early in the planning process for the JFC to evaluate the proposals prior to final decision or implementation.
- ❖ \*Develop program and budget requests that comply with combatant commander guidance on war-fighting requirements and priorities.
- ❖ \*Inform the combatant commander (and any intermediate JFCs) of program and budget decisions that may affect joint operation planning.
- ❖ Provide lateral liaisons with Army, Navy, Marines, SOF, and coalition partners.
- ❖ Maintain discipline, including application of the UCMJ.
- ❖ Establish force protection requirements.

(\*Normally, this is retained by the combatant command level Service component commander.)

When the COMAFFOR is delegated OPCON of the US Air Force component forces, and there is no JFACC, the COMAFFOR has the following **OPCON responsibilities:**

- ❖ Prepare an aerospace estimate of the situation to support the JFC's estimate.
- ❖ Develop and recommend COAs to the JFC.
- ❖ Develop an aerospace strategy and operations plan that states how the COMAFFOR plans to exploit aerospace capabilities to support the JFC's objectives.
- ❖ Establish (or enforce, when passed down by the JFC) theater rules of engagement (ROEs) for all assigned and attached forces.
- ❖ Make air apportionment recommendations to the JFC.
- ❖ Task, plan, coordinate, and allocate the daily aerospace effort.
- ❖ Serve as the supported commander for counterair operations, strategic attack, the JFC's overall air interdiction effort, and theater airborne reconnaissance and surveillance. As the supported commander, the JFACC has the authority to designate the target priority, effects, and timing of these operations and attack targets within land and naval AOs.
- ❖ Function as the supporting commander, as directed by the JFC, for operations such as close air support (CAS), air interdiction within the land and naval component areas of operations (AOs), and maritime support.

- ❖ Act as airspace control authority (ACA), if so designated.
- ❖ Act as area air defense commander (AADC), if so designated.
- ❖ Coordinate combat search and rescue.
- ❖ Direct intratheater air mobility operations and coordinate them with intertheater air mobility operations.
- ❖ Conduct joint training, including the training, as directed, of components of other Services in joint operations for which the COMAFFOR has or may be assigned primary responsibility or for which the US Air Force component's facilities and capabilities are suitable.

## THE JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER

The JFC normally will designate a JFACC to exploit the capabilities of joint aerospace operations through a cohesive Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP) and a responsive and integrated control system. (For more detail on the JAOP, see chapter six). The JFACC recommends the proper employment of aerospace forces from multiple components. The JFACC also plans, coordinates, allocates, tasks, executes, and assesses aerospace operations to accomplish assigned operational missions. **Because of the theaterwide scope of aerospace operations, the JFACC will typically maintain the same JOA/theaterwide perspective as the JFC.** The JFACC, as with any component commander, should not be dual-hatted as the JFC.

**The JFACC should be the component commander with the preponderance of aerospace assets and the capability to plan, task, and control joint aerospace operations.** The JFC gives the JFACC the authority necessary to accomplish assigned missions and tasks. When designated as the JFACC, the COMAFFOR normally maintains OPCON of assigned and attached US Air Force forces and normally receives TACON of forces from other components as directed by the JFC. **When the COMAFFOR is designated the JFACC, the US Air Force compo-**



**Operation DESERT STORM aptly demonstrated the decisive effects of joint/multinational aerospace power under the command of a JFACC.**

**istent staff structure normally forms the basis for the JFACC staff.** In cases where the COMAFFOR commands an ASETF, the principal component staff directorates (A-1 through A-6) normally assume parallel JFACC staff functions. Additionally, some A-staff personnel should provide a presence in the JAOC and provide the COMAFFOR/JFACC with access to component information. Augmentation within each directorate from relevant Service components ensures adequate joint representation on the JFACC staff. At the discretion of the JFACC, officers from other Services may fill key deputy and principal staff JFACC positions. In this arrangement US Air Force component and joint air component functions and responsibilities remain distinct; both are essential to successful joint aerospace operations. When the US Air Force component staff assumes JFACC staff functions, the JFACC must provide a clear definition of responsibilities and adequate resources to ensure both US Air Force component and JFACC staff functions operate effectively.

**The COMAFFOR, when designated as the JFACC, must be prepared to assume the following responsibilities,** as assigned by the JFC:

- ❖ Organize a JFACC staff manned with personnel from each component to reflect the composition of aerospace capabilities and forces controlled by the JFACC.
- ❖ Develop a joint aerospace strategy and JAOP.
- ❖ Plan, coordinate, allocate, and task the joint aerospace capabilities and forces made available to the JFACC by direction of the JFC.
- ❖ Recommend apportionment to the JFC.
- ❖ Control execution of current joint aerospace operations to include:
  - ❖❖ Counterair, to include theater missile defense.
  - ❖❖ Strategic attack.
  - ❖❖ Counterland.
  - ❖❖ Countersea.
  - ❖❖ Counterspace.
  - ❖❖ Intratheater air mobility.
  - ❖❖ Counterinformation.
- ❖ Coordinate:
  - ❖❖ Combat search and rescue.
  - ❖❖ Intertheater air mobility support.

- ❖ SOF operations with the joint special operations task force (JSOTF) or joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC).
- ❖ Perform combat assessment of joint aerospace operations at the operational and tactical levels.
- ❖ Serve as the airspace control authority (ACA), if so designated.
- ❖ Serve as the area air defense commander (AADC), if so designated.
- ❖ Serve as the supported commander for counterair operations, strategic attack, the JFC's overall air interdiction effort, and theater airborne reconnaissance and surveillance. As the supported commander, the JFACC has the authority to designate the target priority, effects, and timing of these operations and attack targets within land and naval AOs.
- ❖ Serve as the supporting commander, as directed by the JFC, for operations such as CAS, air interdiction within the land and naval component AOs, and maritime support.
- ❖ Provide integrated theater ISR for the JFC.

**If another Service provides the JFACC, the COMAFFOR will relinquish TACON of assigned forces to the JFACC as directed by the JFC.** In addition, the COMAFFOR will coordinate with the JFACC through an LNO team and fill designated billets within the JFACC staff and JAOC. However, the COMAFFOR will maintain an A-staff and a command and control function to perform Service specific functions. Also, some A-staff personnel should continue to participate in the JAOC as information conduits between the JFACC and the COMAFFOR.

If working with allies in a coalition or alliance operation, the JFACC may be designated the air component commander (ACC). For very large and complex operations, as might be encountered with large coalitions, the COMAFFOR function might be separate from the JFACC (or ACC) function. When a separate COMAFFOR is established, a separately manned US Air Force component staff is normally appropriate. This provides US Air Force elements more focused Air Force leadership and permits the JFACC to focus on joint and multinational issues.

**By definition, the JFACC must control and execute aerospace assets of other Services, in whole or in part, depending on the situation. However, the other Services have developed their air arms with differing doctrinal and operating constructs in mind.** They have other mission priorities (primarily support of surface forces) that constrain their availability to exploit the full scope of aerospace


operations at the strategic and operational levels of war. Similar concerns also apply to the aviation arms of our allies. The JFACC must consider these differing philosophies when developing the aerospace portion of a joint campaign.

- ✿ **Army aviation assets** normally are retained for employment as organic forces; current Army doctrine considers Army aviation forces as maneuver units. However, some Army helicopters could be employed in CAS operations, while some Army helicopters could also be employed in interdiction, in which case they may come under the purview of the JFACC when the JFACC has been tasked to plan and execute the theater interdiction effort. The same can hold true for other systems (such as the Army Tactical Missile System) when employed for interdiction or offensive counterair, depending on tasking and target location.
- ✿ **Naval aviation assets** include carrier-based aircraft, land-based naval aircraft, and TOMAHAWK cruise missiles and provide a diverse array of power projection capabilities. Such assets, beyond those retained as needed for fleet defense and related naval missions, are available for tasking via the ATO process.
- ✿ **Marine aviation assets.** The primary mission of Marine aviation is support of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) ground element. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the JFC for tasking through the ACC for the support of other components of the joint force or the joint force as a whole.
- ✿ **SOF aviation assets.** The JFC may assign control of SOF aviation forces to either a Service or a functional component commander. When SOF air assets are employed as part of joint SOF operations, the JFC may assign control of those forces to the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC). However, if SOF aviation assets are assigned primarily in support of the theater air operation, then the JFC may assign control of those assets to the JFACC. Whether operating autonomously or in conjunction with conventional forces, special operations must be integrated into, and closely coordinated with, other air activities supporting the theater campaign. Integration is crucial because air assets and SOF are the only forces that routinely operate deep in enemy territory. In order to ensure the correct employment of forces, the JFSOCC provides the JFACC a special operations liaison element (SOLE) to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate SOF operations, strategy, and plans with conventional air.

## COMAFFOR HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION: THE “A-STAFF”

The COMAFFOR headquarters should usually be comprised of normal staff directorates, A-1 through A-6, as well as a special staff. The A-staff structure is used instead of the more “traditional” US Air Force staff designations (DO, LG, SC, etc.) to more readily identify the Air Force component staff equivalents of the corresponding J-staff functions. Figure 4.3 depicts the organization of a COMAFFOR headquarters. In some cases, senior component liaison elements may not be needed. Some of the required support may be obtained through reachback. Finally, for very small or limited operations, a “full” A-staff may not be required.


**The organization for a COMAFFOR who is dual-hatted as the JFACC is the largest, most robust capability required and will include a full A-staff, a JAOC, a JAOC director, and a Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR).** The COMAFFOR staff normally forms the basis for the JFACC staff; however, the COMAFFOR staff still retains its function as the primary provider for the Air Force component. The principal Air Force component staff directorates (A-1 through A-6) normally assume parallel JFACC staff duties. Augmentation from relevant Service components ensures adequate joint representation. At the discretion of the JFACC, officers from other Services may fill key deputy and principal staff positions. This dual-hatted organization is functionally depicted in figure 4.4. (This is also the US Air Force organization when the JFC is operating solely through Service components and has not designated a JFACC). The JAOC will be tailored to the mission of the COMAFFOR/JFACC, and the position of JAOC director may be filled by the A-3. The JAOC is discussed in more detail in chapter five.



**Figure 4.3. Notional Headquarters Organization (A-Staff)**

The COMAFFOR's staff advises the COMAFFOR/JFACC and coordinates with the rest of the joint community. It establishes reachback with the US Air Force component rear and supporting units and recommends the US Air Force component's theater architecture for logistics, communications, and intelligence.

In addition to the A-staff, the COMAFFOR should have a special staff and senior component liaisons. The A-staff includes divisions for manpower and personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and communications and information. A brief discussion of the key duties and responsibilities of each staff position follows. The JFACC staff mirrors the COMAFFOR staff and the responsibilities are similar. The JFACC staff functions, however, will normally not provide for Service component maintenance but will have unique functional responsibilities to the JFACC. All JFACC staff functions should ensure adequate representation and augmentation to satisfy joint personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and



**Figure 4.4. Notional Headquarters with COMAFFOR as JFACC**

communications issues. (**Note:** The following discussion of A-staff duties is not intended to be all-inclusive. The differing mission requirements of any given ASETF may dictate different task emphasis and staff arrangements.)

**Personal Staff**—Directly responsible to the commander, the personal staff includes assistants needed to handle matters requiring close personal control by the commander. The commander's legal advisor, public affairs advisor, inspector general, protocol advisor, historian, etc. are generally on the commander's personal staff.

**Special Staff**—The special staff assists the commander and the component staff with technical, administrative, or tactical matters; e.g., comptroller, counterintelligence and special investigations, chaplain, medical, etc. The special staff is usually small and can be located within the directorates as an option.

**Senior Component Liaisons**—The senior LNO from each component represents his or her respective commander and reports directly to the JFACC. Subordinate LNOs from each component perform duties throughout the JFACC staff as required, providing weapon system expertise. LNOs must be knowledgeable of the capabilities and limitations of their units and Service.

*A bulky staff implies a division of responsibility, slowness of action, and indecision, whereas a small staff implies activity and concentration of purpose.*

**General William T. Sherman**



**Manpower and Personnel (A-1)**—The Director of Manpower and Personnel is the principal staff assistant to the COMAFFOR/JFACC on manpower and personnel management. The A-1 is responsible for executing personnel policies, developing procedures as necessary, and supervising the administrative requirements for personnel. Because component commanders normally receive personnel support from their Service headquarters, the A-1 role is primarily an Air Force component function. Key responsibilities of the A-1 include:

- ❖ Ensure that subordinate US Air Force units are kept informed of personnel actions that affect them.
- ❖ Monitor US Air Force unit strengths by means of daily personnel status reports.
- ❖ Advise the commander and staff on matters concerning unit replacement plans and status of all components.
- ❖ Provide control and standardization of personnel procedures.
- ❖ Maintain records to support recommendations for unit and DOD awards and decorations.
- ❖ Oversee the administration of the headquarters for pay and finance; administration of augmentees; coordination of morale, welfare and recreation activities; and preparation of evaluation, efficiency, and fitness reports.
- ❖ Assist the COMAFFOR in determining the need for, and structure of, organizations.
- ❖ Assist the COMAFFOR in determining and documenting manpower requirements.
- ❖ Assist the COMAFFOR in identifying available manpower resources.
- ❖ Operate and maintain contingency manpower and resource management systems.

**Intelligence (A-2)**—The Director of Intelligence is the principal staff assistant to the COMAFFOR/JFACC for ensuring the availability of intelligence on enemy locations, activities, and capabilities, and probable enemy COAs. The A-2 ensures adequate intelligence support to forces within the assigned area of operations. Key responsibilities of the A-2 include:

- ❖ Serve as the principal advisor to the A-3 and COMAFFOR/JFACC on ISR requirements, capabilities, and limitations.
- ❖ Manage intelligence requirements. Prioritize based on mission needs. Validate subordinate unit requirements.
- ❖ Coordinate intelligence support from national, DOD, Service, and joint intelligence elements and coalition intelligence sources.
- ❖ Direct and coordinate intelligence and information collection and analysis to support COMAFFOR, aerospace operations, and the JFC as directed.

- ❖ Exchange liaison officers as appropriate with JFC and lateral components intelligence staffs.
- ❖ Prescribe security and releasability requirements for intelligence information.

**Operations (A-3)**—The Director of Operations serves as the principal staff assistant to the COMAFFOR/JFACC in the direction and control of US Air Force forces. When OPCON of US Air Force units is formally transferred to the COMAFFOR, the A-3 ensures that they are capable of performing tasked missions. This includes monitoring unit deployments and beddown locations, combat readiness, mission rehearsals, force protection, and training activities. **The A-3 may be dual-hatted as the JAOC director**, and would then be responsible for campaign planning and execution as well. Key responsibilities of the A-3 include:

- ❖ Organize the operational aspects of the headquarters staff.
- ❖❖ Recommend ASETF organization. Normally, responsible for setting up the appropriate C2 nodes (forward-deployed and reachback Air Force forces (AFFOR) locations, deployed wing and group operations centers, etc.).
- ❖❖ Establish and manage daily staff “battle rhythm,” to include daily briefings and meetings.
- ❖❖ Monitor deployed unit operational situation reports.
- ❖❖ Oversee training and standardization/evaluation of ASETF operational units.
- ❖❖ Coordinate AEF unit availability and sourcing with the appropriate MAJCOM staff.
- ❖❖ Establish guidance for and monitoring of OPSEC.
- ❖ Coordinate operational issues with the JFC and component staffs. Typical issues would include:
  - ❖❖ Establish liaison with appropriate supporting commands and agencies.
  - ❖❖ Provide information on the number and location of all friendly aerospace assets.
  - ❖❖ Coordinate joint and coalition training with other components.
  - ❖❖ Establish force protection requirements, including civil defense.
  - ❖❖ Develop Commanders Critical Information Requirements.
  - ❖❖ Identify essential elements of information with A-2.

- ❖ Develop and coordinate a plan that integrates information operations to accomplish the JFC's objectives.
- ❖ Advise the COMAFFOR/JFACC on employment and management of air, space, and information resources for which the COMAFFOR/JFACC has OPCON/TACON or has established supported/supporting relationships.

**Logistics (A-4)**—The Director of Logistics is the principal staff assistant to the COMAFFOR/JFACC for formulation of logistics plans and the coordination and supervision of force beddown, transportation, supply, maintenance, mortuary affairs, food and exchange services, civil engineering, explosive ordnance disposal, fire fighting, and related logistics activities. In general, the A-4 formulates and implements policies and guidance to ensure effective logistics support to all US Air Force forces. Most of the challenges confronting this division will be US Air Force component unique. Key responsibilities of the A-4 include:

- ❖ Coordinate the overall logistics functions and requirements of the COMAFFOR and maintain liaison with logistics functions of other components and the JTF J-4.
- ❖ Advise commander concerning logistics matters that affect the accomplishment of COMAFFOR/JFACC missions.
- ❖ Establish and operate a logistics readiness center or combat support center.
- ❖ Identify, coordinate, and monitor logistics requirements to ensure deployed forces are sustained from the onset of operations, including CONUS resupply and reachback, time definite delivery movements, theater distribution with JTF J-4 and other Services, and timely retrograde of personnel and reparable materiel.
- ❖ Formulate COMAFFOR logistics policies.
- ❖ Coordinate logistics requirements and support with the logistics team in the JAOC.
- ❖ Coordinate all COMAFFOR food service, mortuary affairs, lodging, and field exchange requirements.
- ❖ Identify contractor personnel employed in the AOR to support US Air Force forces, and monitor contractor support activities to ensure continuity of operations.
- ❖ Coordinate beddown of all JFACC forces when COMAFFOR is designated JFACC.

- ❖ Coordinate common item supply support that is a COMAFFOR responsibility.
- ❖ Monitor the ammunition and fuel support capability of all JFACC forces.
- ❖ Identify and monitor transportation movement requirements.
- ❖ Arrange for and coordinate COMAFFOR host-nation support requirements with the JTF J-4.
- ❖ Coordinate agreements for inter-Service supply and support with components and JTF J-4.
- ❖ Exercise staff supervision or cognizance over applicable civil engineering, maintenance, recovery, and salvage operations.
- ❖ Monitor and coordinate theater aerial ports and theater distribution processes affecting Air Force operations.

**Plans (A-5)**—The Director of Plans serves as the principal staff assistant to the COMAFFOR/JFACC for all consolidated planning functions. The A-5 conducts comprehensive force-level movement and execution planning throughout the campaign. This involves preparation and subsequent refinement of the force flow, beddown, and redeployment in the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). The A-5 normally leads the A-staff in crisis action planning and publishing the US Air Force component OPORD to support the JFC's campaign. Key responsibilities of the A-5 include:

- ❖ Perform collaborative planning with the JTF and the coalition and Service staffs.
- ❖ Initiate and oversee AFFOR support of JTF CAP activities.
- ❖ Facilitate component OPORD development.
- ❖ Determine unit beddown requirements for US Air Force forces.
- ❖ Integrate US Air Force execution planning efforts with JTF (J-5 and J-35), coalition, and Service staffs throughout the campaign.
- ❖❖ Determine requirements for additional forces or capabilities.
- ❖❖ When necessary, prepare air allocation request and air support request messages.
- ❖❖ Develop relevant branch plans (potential developments) for aerospace forces.
- ❖❖ Develop relevant sequel plans (logical follow-on outcomes) for aerospace forces, to include conflict resolution and redeployment.

**Communications and Information (A-6)**—The Director of Communications and Information is the principal staff assistant to the COMAFFOR/JFACC for communications-electronics and automated information systems. This includes establishing the theater communications and automated systems architecture to support operational and command requirements. Key responsibilities of the A-6 include:


- ❖ Coordinate the overall communications and information functions of the COMAFFOR/JFACC and maintain liaison with communications and information functions of the other components, the JTF J-6, Joint Communications Control Center, Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), and Defense Information Systems Agency area communications operations center as required.
- ❖ Formulate COMAFFOR communications and information policies.
- ❖ Ensure frequency allocations and assignments meet technical parameters under host-nation agreements, coordinate these actions with the A-3 and JTF J-6, deconflict frequencies, and provide communications-electronics operating instructions for assigned forces.
- ❖ Assign call signs.
- ❖ Plan, coordinate, and monitor communications security (COMSEC) procedures and assets.
- ❖ Coordinate information protection requirements and procedures with the AOC IW team.
- ❖ Advise AOC on development of communications architecture inputs to the JAOP.
- ❖ Coordinate plans with JTF J-6.
- ❖ Ensure communications and information interface requirements are satisfied.
- ❖ Extend required communications and information connectivity to subordinate US Air Force units (to include reachback units) and other components.
- ❖ Oversee the administration of the headquarters postal services.

## **AIR MOBILITY INTEGRATION**

Because of the global nature of air mobility, special attention must be given to balance these resources with national requirements and priorities. At the same time, the air mobility systems performing intratheater

and intertheater missions must function in close coordination with one another to provide seamless mobility to the supported combatant commander with responsive and integrated aerial movement. Command relationships must allow an interlocking arrangement to manage intratheater and intertheater air mobility operations. Normally, intratheater air mobility forces will be attached to the JFC with OPCON or TACON delegated to the COMAFFOR/JFACC.

A JTF mission will often require AMC air mobility augmentation. Air mobility ground elements attached to the JTF and in the AOR or JOA normally will be TACON to the JFC, delegated to the COMAFFOR/JFACC, and exercised through the DIRMObFOR. In some circumstances, a limited number of intertheater air mobility aircraft may be transferred or made available for tasking on a sortie-by-sortie basis, by the COMAFFOR/JFACC for the JFC. Command relationships for air mobility forces are depicted in figure 4.5.



**Figure 4.5. Sample Command Relationships for Air Mobility Forces**

## Director of Mobility Forces

**The DIRMOBFOR is the COMAFFOR's or JFACC's designated coordinating authority for air mobility with all commands and agencies both internal and external to the JTF.** The DIRMOBFOR provides direction to the Air Mobility Division (AMD) in the AOC and normally will be a senior Air Force officer familiar with the AOR. When intertheater air mobility forces are employed in support of a JFC, the DIRMOBFOR should have experience in intertheater air mobility operations. The DIRMOBFOR may be sourced by the theater US Air Force component commander or nominated by the AMC commander. To ensure close coordination with the overall theater air effort, the DIRMOBFOR should work directly for the COMAFFOR/JFACC. For operations where the preponderance of forces are air mobility assets, or for air mobility-only operations, the COMAFFOR/JFACC may be dual-hatted as the DIRMOBFOR. The DIRMOBFOR's specific authorities and responsibilities include:

- ✿ Direct the integration of intertheater air mobility support provided by USTRANSCOM-assigned mobility forces.
- ✿ Coordinate the tasking of USTRANSCOM intertheater air mobility forces (air and ground) attached (TACON) to the JFC.
- ✿ Direct the tasking of intratheater air mobility forces (air and ground) attached (either OPCON or TACON) to the JFC.
- ✿ Coordinate with the AOC director to ensure all air mobility operations supporting the JFC are fully integrated with the ATO cycle and deconflicted with all other air operations.
- ✿ Coordinate with the tanker airlift control center (TACC), through the AMD, all intertheater air mobility missions to ensure the most effective use of these resources in accomplishing the JFC, theater, and USTRANSCOM missions.

## Intertheater Operations

The US Air Force has increasingly become a CONUS-based force with global responsibilities. To fulfill these responsibilities, the US Air Force has increased the number and intensity of intertheater operations in both plans and practice. Operations such as global attack, strategic brigade airdrop, and ASETF deployment require the close coordination of many commands. Command relationships must be clearly understood to succeed.

Intertheater operations normally involve concurrent action by combat assets under OPCON of the JTF commander and air mobility forces under OPCON of the AMC commander. During transit between theaters, the AMC commander normally will exercise OPCON over the mission until it reaches the boundaries of the JTF commander's JOA or the geographic commander's AOR. Upon entry into the JOA/AOR, the JFC will assume TACON of those forces in the flight that have been assigned or attached to the JTF.

### **Operations Primarily Involving Air Mobility**

Throughout the range of possible military operations involving aerospace power, some may only require air mobility assets to meet the commander's objectives. Three examples of this are humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and NEO. In some of these circumstances, combat assets may be needed as a guard against hostile actions or to provide covering fire. However, in these instances, the combat assets act in a supporting role for the main air mobility effort.

In operations primarily involving air mobility, there may be insufficient combat activity to warrant the formation of a full AOC/JAOC. Although not the norm, in some cases, the COMAFFOR, DIRMObFOR, and AOC director may be the same individual, and if in a joint operation, might also be designated the JFACC and JAOC director. In these situations, the AOC would consist primarily of an Air Mobility Division and sufficient other expertise to control all air mobility operations within the JOA/AOR, to produce an ATO, and manage the required combat sorties.

### **Air Mobility Operations External to the Joint Task Force**

External to a CINC or JTF's JOA is an extensive capability, comprised of functional aerospace forces, supporting the NCA and the joint commander's objectives. These functional forces interact with joint forces via direct supporting missions or with the JFC when conducting deployed operations in concert with assigned or attached forces.

The US Air Force presents forces to the joint community by packaging aerospace power into an ASETF and assigning or attaching these forces to JTFs. It also presents forces when functional combatant commands conduct global operations on behalf of the NCA and JFCs. These global operations may consist of a single sortie or action that meets an NCA or JFC course of action or may consist of sustained operations by forces

supporting one or more JTFs. These sustained operations will typically originate outside of a JTF's JOA. For example, an expeditionary wing, consisting of an expeditionary air refueling squadron, an expeditionary airlift squadron, and a tanker airlift control element (TALCE), may deploy to a bare base to conduct airbridge and combat asset deployment operations in support of several JTFs.

Geographic combatant command air component commanders designate their assigned NAF or NAF slice as the JTF air component. USTRANSCOM, as a functional combatant command, designates AMC as its air component. AMC does not further delegate its air component responsibilities because of the inherent advantages in centralizing control of the global intertheater air mobility system in the TACC and decentralizing execution through CONUS-based wings and deployed expeditionary units. The command and control structure that plans and executes missions throughout the globe is both similar to but separate from the structure that exists within a JTF.

All forces assigned or attached to the JTF will be part of an ASETF. They will be under the OPCON of the JFC and organized as expeditionary wings, groups, and squadrons. Air mobility forces not attached to the JTF will remain under the OPCON of AMC, tasked through the TACC, and designated as expeditionary wings, groups, or squadrons. The COMAFFOR accesses these capabilities through his DIRMObFOR in coordination with the TACC. Expeditionary wings, groups, and squadrons will consist of units drawn from each component of the air mobility triad. Each unit will retain their original unit designation and commander. In those cases where more than one air mobility unit is deployed to one location, a single commander will be designated for those mobility forces.



## CHAPTER FIVE

# THE JOINT AIR OPERATIONS CENTER

*Nothing could be more fatal to successful results than to dissipate the air resources into small packets placed under command of army formation commanders, with each packet working on its own plan. The soldier must not expect or wish to exercise direct command over air striking forces.*



**Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery**

The JAOC is the aerospace operations planning and execution focal point for the JTF and is where centralized planning, direction, control, and coordination of aerospace operations occur for which the COMAFFOR/JFACC has OPCON/TACON. JAOC personnel are responsible for planning, executing, and assessing aerospace operations and directing changes as the situation dictates.

This chapter broadly describes the JAOC's key functions and notional organization, as well as the fundamental aerospace assessment, planning, and execution process that drives the JAOC. The JAOC can perform a wide range of functions that can be tailored and scaled to a specific or changing mission and to the associated task force the US Air Force presents to the JFC. Thus, *the US Air Force would not necessarily provide all of the elements described in the following sections if the situation does not warrant them.* AFI 13-1 AOC, volume 3, *Operational Procedures—Aerospace Operations Center*, contains more detailed discussion on AOC composition and processes.

### PRIMARY JAOC FUNCTIONS

The primary functions of the JAOC are to:

- ❖ Develop aerospace operations strategy and planning documents that integrate air, space, and information operations to meet JFACC objectives and guidance.

- ❖ **Task and execute day-to-day aerospace operations;** provide rapid reaction, positive control, and coordinate and deconflict weapons employment as well as integrate the total aerospace effort.
- ❖ Receive, assemble, analyze, filter, and disseminate all-source intelligence and weather information to support aerospace operations planning, execution, and assessment.
- ❖ Issue **airspace control** procedures and coordinate airspace control activities for the ACA when the JFACC is designated the ACA.
- ❖ Provide **overall direction of air defense**, including TMD, for the AADC when the JFACC is designated the AADC.
- ❖ **Plan, task, and execute the theater ISR mission.**

<b>JFACC Roles</b>  <b>AADC</b> <b>ISR</b> <b>ACA</b>	<p>The JFACC normally will be the area air defense commander (AADC), the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) coordinator, and the airspace control authority (ACA) because these functions demand integration to ensure unity of command and effort. This is central to the US Air Force's tenet of centralized control. The theater-wide perspective of the airman logically dictates control of these theater-wide activities. However, <b>these functions</b>, although primarily concerned with aerospace power and Air Force systems, are not uniquely US Air Force—they accrue to the JFACC.</p>
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**Figure 5.1. JFACC Roles**

- ❖ Conduct operational-level assessment to determine mission and overall aerospace operations effectiveness as required by the JFC to support the theater combat assessment effort.
- ❖ Produce and disseminate an ATO and changes.
- ❖ Provide for the integration and support of all air mobility missions.

## **THE AEROSPACE ASSESSMENT, PLANNING, AND EXECUTION PROCESS**

Joint operations planning and tasking is a continuous cycle. Three general phases can be identified: assessment, planning, and execution.

**Assessment.** Assessment is done at all levels of command. It is how commanders conduct operational environment research and develop COAs. The commander should establish a dynamic system to support assessment for all components. Assessment includes evaluation of resource


constraints and operations effectiveness to achieve command objectives. Effective campaign planning and execution require a continuing evaluation and assessment of the impact of joint force operations and resource constraints on the overall campaign. At the completion of any assigned task or mission objective, a combat assessment is performed at all levels of command to evaluate the effectiveness of the operation. This assessment provides the basis for further refinement or development of a revised campaign plan or the establishment of new operational tasks or objectives.

**Planning.** The specific objectives developed during the assessment phase are used to focus tasking and targeting development. The commander provides broad guidance and objectives and a vision of what constitutes military success. The commander also defines the intent of the operation or campaign and sets priorities. The commander's guidance and objectives will identify broad categories of tasking and targeting priorities, planning guidance, procedures, appropriate maneuver and movement control, joint fire support coordinating measures, ROE, AO boundaries, command relationships, and supported/supporting roles between commanders that define direct support. This guidance will also include the apportionment decision.

Planning is an iterative process. Tasks and targets are nominated to support the objectives and the commander's priorities. All potential tasks and targets are developed through the planning cross-functional teams, which will identify, prioritize, and select specific tasks while considering available resources. In accordance with the commander's objectives and coalition or component requirements, the operations staff will develop the necessary plans to employ capabilities and forces. During weaponeering and force allocation, tasking and targeting personnel quantify the expected results using modeling and simulation methods. The final prioritized tasking and targets are then included in a Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP) that forms the foundation of the ATO. After the commander approves the MAAP, teams finalize the ATO, special instructions (SPINS), and the airspace control order (ACO). The end product of the planning phase is an ATO, an air defense plan, and a prioritized list of tasks and targets with planned time of execution.

**Execution.** The JFACC directs the execution and deconfliction of all aerospace operations and force capabilities made available by the JFC. Components and supporting commanders execute the ATO as tasked and recommend changes as appropriate, given emerging JFC and component

requirements. During execution, the JFACC is the command authority for revising the tasking of joint aerospace capabilities and forces, unless authority to redirect and task is delegated to subordinate execution control elements. The JAOC is also charged with coordinating and deconflicting changes with the appropriate control agencies or components. Ground or airborne command and control mission commanders may be delegated the authority to redirect tasks/sorties/missions made available to higher priority tasks or targets as necessary. It is essential, however, that all affected commanders and forces be notified of all redirected missions impacting their execution operations or planning. Figure 5.2 illustrates this process:



**Figure 5.2. The Aerospace Assessment, Planning, and Execution Process**

## OTHER OPERATIONAL AND PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

**Information Operations (IO).** As the US Air Force continues to operationalize the concept of information superiority, the JFACC must be prepared to lead in IO strategies, planning, execution, and assessment;

integrate (as necessary) IO capabilities of all Services; and conduct IO in a supporting role to other component commanders. IO must be integral to the overall JFACC aerospace planning process, in support of war-fighting CINCs. The JFACC must also be prepared to conduct independent IO tasking as directed through appropriate command channels.

In addition, the JFACC must have a C2 system that fully integrates information operations into the campaign plan. Adversaries will target C2 systems and the supporting infrastructure as high value assets. Commanders must have accurate situation awareness. US dependence on information and information systems and the exposure of US vulnerabilities to a full range of threats, from computer hacking by criminals, vandals, and terrorists to overt attack by nation states, have brought focus and compelling relevance to emerging IO concepts. Information operations in support of a commander's campaign or operation may include planning and execution by non-DOD forces, agencies, or organizations and must be thoroughly synchronized, coordinated, and deconflicted with all other aspects and elements of the supported campaign or operation. Refer to AFDD 2-5, *Information Operations*, and Joint Pub 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, for more detailed discussion.

**Nuclear Operations.** US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and theater CINCs conduct nuclear planning, with CJCS and Office of the Secretary of Defense and NCA oversight and review. USSTRATCOM plans and analyzes a variety of nuclear weapons for any theater. Nuclear C2 includes development and modification of plans for employment of nuclear weapons and for operations in support of nuclear employment, to include dissemination of retargeting directives to forces and applications of forces necessary to implement the planning directive. A more complete discussion of global and nuclear operations is contained in Joint Pub 3-12, *Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations*, and Joint Pub 3-12.1, *Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations*.

**Space Operations.** United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) is the nation's sole combatant command authority over Service space components. The Commander in Chief, United States Space Command (USCINCSpace) exercises authority through service component commands.

The Commander, Fourteenth Air Force (14 AF/CC) is the designated US Air Force component commander for managing, integrating, and directing Air Force space forces. Within joint channels, 14 AF/CC is also

dual-hatted as Commander, Air Force Space Forces (COMAFSPACE). 14 AF/CC provides space support to theater forces as required through the AFSPACE aerospace operations center (AOC), the space equivalent to the JAOC and the single focal point for theater space support. It continually monitors the status of all AFSPACE forces and coordinates space requests from the theater CINC/JFCs.

In theater, the responsibility of integrating space forces into the joint effort is normally delegated to the JFACC. When authorized by USCINCSpace, the JFACC requests and coordinates employment of US Air Force space assets through COMAFSPACE. The AFSPACE AOC receives these requests, weighs priorities, draws up support plans, and tasks space assets via a daily Space Tasking Order (STO).

Since most Air Force space assets support multiple theaters and strategic objectives, OPCON of AFSPACE forces is usually not transferred to a regional CINC/JFC. Instead, USCINCSpace typically establishes a support relationship with the theater CINC. The JFACC, as the supported commander for space operations within the theater, then provides inputs to COMAFSPACE who in turn supports the JFACC's space operations. Thus, COMAFSPACE provides the desired effects at the time and place chosen by the JFACC to the extent authorized by USCINCSpace.

**Logistics Operations.** Logistics and combat support should be integrated with operational planning systems to support the concept of employment-driven logistics planning. Logistics C2 systems support readiness, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and reconstitution of US forces back to peacetime readiness. Highly responsive control over the entire supply chain, including repair, manufacturing, distribution, and transportation is critical to agile combat support of expeditionary aerospace operations. Managing these interrelated processes is crucial to reducing the mobility footprint of expeditionary aerospace forces without sacrificing operational effectiveness. Operational planning should optimize limited support resources by exploiting emerging capabilities to increase the velocity, flexibility, accuracy, and reliability of logistics support.

**Mobility Operations.** The COMAFFOR/JFACC controls intratheater airlift through the airlift control team (ALCT) in the JAOC. The ALCT plans, coordinates, and manages the execution of intratheater airlift operations. The ALCT will coordinate planning with the air mobility element (AME) or the TACC if no AME is established in theater, the joint movement center, and the DIRMObFOR if designated. Direct liaison

and coordination between the logistic support agencies of the participating components and other supporting forces are essential and should occur during the preliminary planning stages. Mobility planning culminates in the publication of an air movement plan.

## NOTIONAL JAOC ORGANIZATION

The integrated team concept is fundamental to the JAOC. These teams are formed by individuals from various areas of expertise and should be **flexible**, with an emphasis on integration of capabilities and the **avoidance of stovepipes**. This concept breaks down the information barriers

between traditional JAOC cells by placing various experts in integrated teams to accomplish strategy development, operational-level assessment, detailed planning, ATO production, and execution functions. However, the process is not so rigid that it precludes making real-time changes as circumstances dictate—**this is a flexible process**. A key advantage of the integrated team concept is that a single leader has oversight over the outputs and processes of each step in the aerospace assessment, planning, and execution process. **JAOC personnel should be assigned to teams and not isolated cells.**

A full JAOC normally is led by a JAOC director and may have up to four divisions with ten core teams, and numerous specialty and support teams. The A-staff directors, A-1 through A-6, support the JAOC director in planning and executing the COMAFFOR/JFACC's operational tasks and fulfill their responsibilities by supervising their personnel on the JAOC teams. Specialty and support team members move into the core teams as required. (Note: The following discussion describes a notional JAOC organization capable of a full range of potential tasks. Actual JAOC organizations afield may reflect the results of conscious decisions based on assigned missions and the scope of the operation.)



**Figure 1.3. JAOC Organization**

## **JAOC Director**

The JAOC director is charged with the effectiveness of joint aerospace operations and focuses on planning, coordinating, allocating, tasking, executing, and assessing aerospace operations in the AOR/JOA based on COMAFFOR/JFACC guidance and DIRMOBFOR coordination. It is the director's responsibility to ensure JAOC functions necessary to complete the aerospace assessment, planning, and execution process are executed in a timely, efficient manner.

## **Core Teams**

The workload in each division is usually parceled out among core teams, which drive the planning and execution process. These teams have functional experts under the direction of a single team leader and operate with a common purpose to achieve unity of effort. The number of teams and their size vary according to the scope of the operation a given JAOC is supporting. For a large operation, a JAOC may organize its core teams in its divisions as follows:

- ❖ **Strategy Division:** Strategy plans team and operational assessment team (some variations also have a target integration team).
- ❖ **Combat Plans Division:** MAAP team and ATO/ACO production team.
- ❖ **Combat Operations Division:** Offensive operations team and defensive operations team.
- ❖ **Air Mobility Division:** Air mobility control team (AMCT), airlift control team (ALCT), aerial refueling control team (ARCT), and air mobility element (AME), and aeromedical evacuation control team (AECT).

The core teams are composed of permanent, principal, and temporary members. Permanent members have no other responsibilities in the JAOC, are experienced in their positions, and usually have specific training. Principal members are experts within their functional area, are required for the core team's mission, and stay with the team but have other JAOC responsibilities. Temporary members contribute special expertise as the need arises.

**The central JAOC process is the aerospace assessment, planning, and execution process.** The core teams are the owners of this process, and everyone in the JAOC supports that effort. The goal of the team approach is to produce an effective JAOP and ATO to meet JFC and JFACC objectives.

## Strategy Division

**The Strategy Division develops, refines, disseminates, and assesses the progress of the JFACC's aerospace strategy.** This division is **responsible for the long-range planning of aerospace operations across the theater.** It should strike a balance between long range planning and intimate involvement with day-to-day ATO production or execution. Though responsible for strategy development, the Strategy Division must remain aware of the detailed planning and execution of the JAOP to ensure continuity from strategy to execution. Although it is located in the JAOC and reports to the JAOC director for continuity with JAOC processes, the Strategy Division has a special direct relationship with the COMAFFOR/JFACC. Representatives from a range of functional areas, such as operations, intelligence, communications, logistics, and space, are principal members of the division. The Strategy Division normally:

- ✿ Develops the JFACC aerospace estimate of the situation. The division normally will use the JFC's strategic appreciation to develop the estimate.
- ✿ Serves as the JFACC's focal point for overall development and coordination of the JAOP in support of the JFC's theater campaign.
- ✿ Develops the joint aerospace strategy and assesses its support of the theater campaign.
- ✿ Translates NCA, JFC, and JFACC guidance into target sets for planning and execution in the ATO.
- ✿ Generates a recommended apportionment decision for the JFC.
- ✿ Determines target sets to achieve these tasks.
- ✿ Determines priority, sequencing, and phasing for the execution of the developed tasks.
- ✿ Serves as the primary liaison with the JFC planners.
- ✿ Integrates functional/Service component task requirements into the ATO.
- ✿ Monitors and assesses the progress of the air phases and provides overall operational level combat assessment with respect to the aerospace objectives.
- ✿ Develops alternative contingency plans and COAs.
- ✿ Provides input to the development of an ISR plan for the JTF.
- ✿ Provides input to the development of an IO plan for the JTF.

## Combat Plans Division

**The Combat Plans Division is responsible for the near-term aerospace operations planning** function of the JAOC. This division develops detailed plans for the application of aerospace resources based on JFACC approved guidance received from the Strategy Division. These plans include the near-term guidance, allocation and apportionment, and tasking instructions for assigned and attached forces. This is accomplished through the preparation of ATOs. The Combat Plans Division transmits the ATO to the Combat Operations Division for execution. Generally, the Combat Plans Division works the two ATO periods beyond the current ATO. The Combat Plans Division normally has the following responsibilities:

- ❖ Develops combat assessment to achieve JFC and JFACC objectives.
- ❖ Determines the optimal combination of target, platform, weapon, and timing for missions included in the ATO.
- ❖ Ensures aerospace tasking supports the overall JTF campaign.
- ❖ Produces and disseminates an operationally and tactically sound ATO.
- ❖ Generates SPINS and the daily ACO or ACO updates.

## Combat Operations Division

**The Combat Operations Division executes the ATO.** It analyzes, prioritizes, and, if necessary, makes recommendations to the JFACC (or designated representative) to redirect assets. ACA and AADC representatives, along with component LNO staffs, should be part of this decision-making process. The Combat Operations Division normally has these responsibilities:

- ❖ Executes the current ATO through constant monitoring of air missions under control of the theater air control system.
- ❖ Evaluates IO effectiveness, to include ISR feedback.
- ❖ Adjusts the ATO as necessary in response to battlespace dynamics (e.g., assigned targets are no longer valid, high priority targets are detected, enemy action threatens friendly forces).
- ❖ Coordinates emergency and immediate air support requests.
- ❖ Monitors and recommends changes to defensive operations.
- ❖ Publishes changes to the ATO.
- ❖ Provides feedback on status of the current ATO.

## Air Mobility Division

**The Air Mobility Division plans, coordinates, tasks, and executes the air mobility mission.** The AMD is located in the JAOC and is directed by the DIRMObFOR. The JAOC director ensures the AMD works as an effective division of the JAOC in the aerospace assessment, planning, and execution process. The AMD coordinates with the JFC's movement requirements and control authority, the theater air mobility operations control center, if established, and the AMC TACC as required to derive apportionment guidance, to compute allocation, and to collect requirements. The DIRMObFOR, in conjunction with the JAOC director and the COMAFFOR/JFACC, may adjust the AMD's organizational structure (ensuring all the processes of the AMCT, ARCT, ALCT, and AME are performed) to better interface with the other aerospace planning and execution divisions found in the JAOC and to meet the COMAFFOR/JFACC's requirements. As directed by the DIRMObFOR, the AMD will task attached intratheater air mobility forces through wing and unit command posts when those forces operate from permanent home bases or wing operations centers if forward deployed. Under the direction of the DIRMObFOR, the AMD normally:

- ❖ Integrates and directs the execution of intratheater and intertheater air mobility forces operating in the AOR/JOA and in support of the JFC's requirements and objectives.
- ❖ Maintains the flow of intratheater and intertheater air mobility assets in support of JFC objectives.
- ❖ Coordinates air mobility support for mobility requirements identified and validated by the JFC requirements and movement authority as appropriate.
- ❖ Coordinates aerial refueling planning, tasking, and scheduling to support intertheater and intratheater air operations.
- ❖ Participates in the aerospace assessment, planning, and execution process and coordinates with the JAOC director to ensure the air mobility mission is incorporated in the ATO.
- ❖ Identifies ISR requirements in support of the air mobility mission.
- ❖ Ensures intratheater air mobility missions are visible in the AMC standard C2 system and reflected in the ATO/ACO.

## Specialty Teams

The specialty teams provide a JAOC with diverse capabilities to help orchestrate theater aerospace power. Many of these capabilities are provided to the JAOC from agencies external to the JAOC organization. It is crucial to the

success of the JAOC that these capabilities be interwoven into the aerospace assessment, planning, and execution process.

The JAOC incorporates certain functional leaders to help ensure the best use of like assets. An information warfare team, for instance, spreads its personnel throughout the JAOC under the direction of its team leader. The specialty team leader ensures team members are used effectively throughout the JAOC. The following are examples of specialty teams:

- ❖ Component liaisons.
- ❖ ISR.
- ❖ Area air defense.
- ❖ IW.
- ❖ Space.
- ❖ Airspace management.
- ❖ Rescue coordination.
- ❖ Medical.
- ❖ Weather.
- ❖ Logistics and sustainment.
- ❖ Legal.


### **Support Teams**

Support teams provide direct support to the JAOC and to operational echelons above and below the JAOC (higher headquarters and tactical units). Support teams are led by team chiefs who report to the appropriate level within the JAOC. They perform their tasks allowing the core and specialty teams to focus on the aerospace assessment, planning, and execution process. Examples of support teams are:

- ❖ Intelligence unit support.
- ❖ Systems administration.
- ❖ Combat reports.
- ❖ Information management.
- ❖ Communications center.
- ❖ Supply.
- ❖ Request for information.

## SUMMARY

Based on the previous discussion, a notional, fully staffed JAOC may look like figure 5.4. In summary, the JAOC is the subject of considerable innovation, including process improvement and technology investment.



**Figure 5.4. Notional JAOC with Representative Core, Specialty, and Support Teams**

This diagram illustrates a large notional JAOC with all four major divisions and several support and specialty teams. The mission will determine the actual mix of divisions and teams in the JAOC; not all divisions and teams may be needed. Refer to AFI 13-1 AOC, volume 3, for a more complete discussion of all teams, processes, and supporting systems.



## CHAPTER SIX

# THE JOINT AIR OPERATIONS PLAN

*If I always appear prepared, it is because before entering an undertaking, I have meditated for long and have foreseen what may occur. It is not genius which reveals to me suddenly and secretly what I should do in circumstances unexpected by others; it is thought and preparation.*

Napoleon Bonaparte



## PLANNING AEROSPACE OPERATIONS

Campaigns are the military operations theater commanders use to achieve strategic aims. The campaign plan drives *when* to fight, *what* to attack, and *how* operations are conducted. Even noncombat operations are driven by campaign plans. (Consider, for example, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT which provided humanitarian supplies to the Kurds in northern Iraq.) Campaign plans allow theater commanders to set operational tempo, direct the conduct of battles, envision objectives, develop concepts, and coordinate logistics to achieve victory.

**Typical key tasks of campaign plans include:**

- ❖ Providing a broad concept of operations and sustainment to achieve theater objectives.
- ❖ Providing an orderly scheme of military operations.
- ❖ Identifying the enemy's COGs (e.g., leadership, infrastructure, military) at the strategic and operational levels.
- ❖ Phasing related major operations (these may overlap and need not be consecutive).
- ❖ Composing subordinate forces and designating command relationships.

- ❖ Providing operational direction and tasks to subordinates.
- ❖ Integrating air, space, land, sea, and information efforts into a cohesive whole.

**Planning such operations revolves around precise communication of commander's intent and a shared, clear understanding of the appropriate operational concepts at each level of command.**

Once the overall strategy has been formulated for fighting the war, the theater commander imparts it to his component commanders. They then devise a game plan for supporting the national strategy by integrating the assets under their command. It is from this point onward that strategic concepts are translated into operational missions. The JFC's appreciation of the strategic situation and articulation of the strategic and operational objectives needed to accomplish the mission form the basis for determining the component objectives. The capabilities of aerospace power, whether acting as the decisive force or in support of other components, must be included in strategic planning at the highest level. **If the JFC focuses solely on the classic “post buildup counterattack” as the decisive phase of combat, the JFC may miss an opportunity to drive the enemy out of the fight early on with aerospace power.**

**The air component commander uses the JFC's strategic and operational objectives to develop an aerospace estimate of the situation that results in the formulation of COAs.** Once the air component commander's COA is approved by the JFC, it becomes the basic concept for joint air operations, stating *what* is to be accomplished. **The JAOP and supporting plans state how the air component commander conducts theater aerospace operations.** This is the heart of what is colloquially called “the air campaign.” See appendix H for a notional example of a JAOP.

## **FIVE-STAGE JAOP PLANNING PROCESS**

**Developing the JAOP involves a five-stage planning process, with each stage producing a product.** The JAOP is developed during the concept development and plan development phases of deliberate planning, as the foundation of an OPLAN or CONPLAN, or during the execution planning phase of crisis action planning, in concert with overall theater campaign planning. While the stages are presented in sequential order, work on the various stages can be either concurrent or sequential. Nevertheless, the stages are integrated and the products of

each stage are checked and verified for coherence. This process is most productive after several iterations.

### **Stage 1: Operational Environment Research**


The first stage, operational environment research, is focused on **gaining a comprehensive understanding of the entire theater of operations, the adversary, and friendly forces available to accomplish the JFC's objectives.** Factors to examine during this stage include available forces, command relationships (national and multinational), threat and force protection requirements, rules of engagement, applicable treaties and agreements, base-use rights, and overflight rights. Humanitarian mission research focuses on the level of need in the affected region, available support from allies, nongovernmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations, and degree of political and social stability in the region. Instability can often result in humanitarian operations requiring armed support and should be carefully examined as to how local authorities view the humanitarian situation. What the Western media sees as simple starvation may be viewed locally as a legitimate military strategy, and US involvement could become deeper than expected without a full understanding of the situation. Small-scale contingencies, such as peace enforcement operations, require adequate research to develop a sound mission statement with appropriate boundaries and time limits. Lack of such research can lead to escalatory mission creep with overall negative results.

Additionally, appropriate logistics information is acquired concerning what is available in theater and what is provided through existing ports, depots, war reserve materiel, and host-nation support. Finally, a detailed intelligence picture is developed that includes indications and warning, current intelligence, general military intelligence, target intelligence, and a complete analysis of enemy, neutral, and friendly forces and potential COAs. The products of the first stage are continually revisited and updated during the course of planning and executing theater aerospace operations.

### **Stage 2: Objective Determination**

The second stage, objective determination, results in **clear, concise, attainable, and measurable aerospace objectives that contribute to the accomplishment of the overall campaign objectives.** This is clearly the most important stage of the joint aerospace operations

planning process since it defines exactly **WHAT** the air component commander intends to achieve. When the decision to use military force is made, it is critical that our political leaders define the conditions desired for successful resolution of the war or conflict. Such conditions define the desired end state of the conflict and set the parameters for conflict resolution and termination. From the guidance provided by the NCA, the JFC develops a commander's concept that forms the core of the campaign plan and presents a broad vision of the military goals. Additionally, this concept describes how operations will be sequenced and synchronized to achieve conflict termination objectives. When developing theater aerospace objectives, the air component commander must focus efforts toward the desired end state established by the NCA and refined by the JFC. Aerospace objectives should be clearly and directly tied to the JFC's objectives and fully integrated with the objectives of other components. Since aerospace power can simultaneously affect all levels of war, aerospace objectives are identified at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Finally, aerospace objectives must be measurable. That is, the commander must have a means of determining when individual objectives are accomplished so effort is refocused on the accomplishment of follow-on objectives or sets of objectives. See figure 6.1.



**Figure 6.1. The Relationship Between Objectives and Strategies**

**An example of this process was the island-hopping campaign employed in the Pacific theater during World War II.** To support the national goal of defeating Japan, the strategic objectives included defeating the armed forces on Japanese-held islands. Using the mechanism of isolation, a strategy was developed to bypass Japanese strongholds and allow their garrisons to “wither on the vine.” This strategy was, in turn, supported by the operational-level objectives to gain control of islands and establish air bases on them. From these bases, the mechanism of interdiction was used to cut the Japanese lines of communication and isolate or bypass other islands. At the tactical level, individual air superiority and maritime attack missions (whose objectives were to shoot down Japanese airplanes and sink Japanese shipping) supported the operational strategy by helping to achieve the desired operational effects.

### **Stage 3: Center of Gravity Identification**

The third stage of JAOP development is **COG identification**, which **identifies COGs that can be attacked or disrupted to achieve theater strategic and operational objectives**. Additionally, friendly COGs must be assessed for possible vulnerabilities. COGs are defined as those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force, nation, or alliance derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. COGs are those centers of power that if defeated or disrupted will have the most decisive result. Aerospace power has the ability to attack COGs throughout the theater and engage them simultaneously or sequentially. In any case, a thorough understanding of the theater, the enemy, and the friendly situation is required for correct identification of COGs.

To satisfy the aerospace objectives, and ultimately the theater and national objectives, and to achieve the desired end state, **the air component commander must have a thorough knowledge of what the theater objectives and planned strategies are and have enough information about the enemy to identify COGs**. COG analysis ultimately leads to the identification of vital target sets within the individual COGs. Vital targets are those that, if successfully attacked, will have the greatest effect on the enemy COGs at the operational and strategic levels of war, which in turn affects the enemy. During small-scale contingencies and humanitarian operations, COG identification is just as important, but may be more difficult to ascertain. An example of a humanitarian COG would be the lack of basic agricultural capability of a nation, as opposed to the more apparent problem of hunger. Identifying


the proper COG in this cause-effect relationship leads to a longer-term solution and assists in development of a strategy to make such a nation self-sufficient in feeding its people. Similarly, the proper COG in a peace enforcement contingency is more often the underlying social or political conflict than the resulting acts of violence. In many of these cases, there is very little that can be done due to politico-military constraints. However, an awareness of the COG can help forces in dealing with the problems associated with an operation in a peace enforcement or humanitarian contingency.

The air component commander can plan to attack COGs directly, indirectly, or in combinations of both. Political considerations, projected loss rates, Law of Armed Conflict considerations, available forces, etc., may make direct attacks on the COG unfeasible, thus forcing indirect methods. As the name implies, direct attack involves physically attacking a COG or engaging it in decisive combat. Indirect attack, on the other hand, results in the same or similar effects on a COG through attack of its supporting infrastructure and related elements. Another indirect technique involves attacking targets that may produce a new, more accessible COG. The intent is to force reliance on a single element, such as a line of communication or source of supply, then after reliance is at its maximum, either destroy or exploit the newly created COG. For example, in DESERT STORM, successful attack of the Iraqi fiber-optic telecommunications system forced reliance on transparent radio broadcasts and slow courier services for critical theater-level communications. These newly created COGs were even more accessible for exploitation by friendly forces than the original COG.

Figure 6.2 shows the COG process from start to finish. Note that the process must begin with national policy and military objectives and include assessment of operations to determine if the COG(s) should be adjusted as the operation progresses. The enemy may take actions that make the original COG no longer critical or develop such defensive or dispersion measures that new methods of attack are required.

#### **Stage 4: Strategy Development**

The fourth stage, strategy development, begins once the theater aerospace objectives are determined. The product of this stage is **a clear aerospace strategy statement that defines HOW the air component commander plans to employ aerospace capabilities and forces to achieve the aerospace objectives in support of the JFC's objectives.**



**Figure 6.2. Developing and Attacking a COG**

The theater aerospace strategy remains clearly focused on the theater aerospace objectives and fully coordinated with the actions of other components. Strategy for humanitarian operations might use terms like *distribute, enhance, educate, evacuate, and rebuild*. Terms describing aerospace strategy for small-scale contingencies could include *observe, enforce, patrol, deny, or disarm*. Aerospace strategy at the operational level of war uses terms such as *control, paralyze, isolate, halt, delay, decapitate, destroy*, etc. A strategy statement links the strategy to the objective(s) it is designed to achieve. For example, an objective to "reduce enemy military capability to a defensive posture only" might be supported by the following strategy statement: "Prevent the enemy from conducting coordinated offensive military operations by isolating the leadership from the fielded

military forces through lethal and nonlethal attacks on command and control facilities and infrastructure.” Clearly defined and articulated theater aerospace strategies serve to focus our target selection and actions on the defined objectives and desired end state while minimizing unnecessary diversions and fragmenting of effort.

### **Stage 5: JAOP Development**

JAOP development, the final stage, merges the collective efforts of the other four stages. The product of this stage is **the actual JAOP that details how the theater aerospace effort will support the JFC's overall campaign plan**. The JAOP accomplishes the following:

- ❖ **Integrates the efforts of joint aerospace capabilities and forces.**
- ❖ **Identifies objectives and targets** in priority order.
- ❖ Accounts for current and potential adversary offensive and defensive threats.
- ❖ Conducts target development or system analysis.
- ❖ **Establishes the phasing of theater aerospace operations:**
  - ❖❖ The first phase normally will involve attaining and maintaining the required degree of aerospace superiority to accomplish other joint actions; and
  - ❖❖ Force application, which directly influences the enemy. This may begin in conjunction with the initial counterair and counterspace operations or be delayed until the requisite air superiority is achieved for reduced losses and greater freedom of action.
- ❖ **Indicates what capabilities and forces are required** to achieve theater aerospace objectives.
  - ❖❖ Once total force structure is determined, force availability, deployment timing, beddown availability, and sustainment requirements are matched with logistic and planning requirements.
  - ❖❖ With this information, the air component commander's ability to accomplish the assigned mission is reevaluated and adjusted as necessary.
  - ❖❖ This evaluation includes a comprehensive sustainability assessment.

- ❖ Finally, theater-specific procedures for allocating, tasking, and exercising command and control of joint aerospace capabilities and forces are developed.

**In addition to building the plan for the deployment, beddown, and employment of aerospace forces, the fifth stage of planning should also include considerations for conflict termination and redeployment of forces.** Conflict termination is an area that planners have often overlooked in the past. While planning for the transition from peace to conflict, lodgment and the actual employment of military forces are vitally important aspects of campaign planning; the transition from conflict back to peace is equally important. Incomplete or careless planning for conflict termination can result in the waste of valuable national resources or even a return to hostilities. **The list of considerations for conflict termination is long and unique to each situation, but “planning for the peace” is absolutely necessary.** Typical conflict termination considerations include such actions as providing an interim security force, restoring government functions in both enemy and friendly areas, enforcing restrictions and sanctions, providing force protection, and providing food and shelter for the indigenous population. Similarly, the redeployment of forces out of an area of conflict also requires careful planning. Forces and capabilities should be withdrawn in a coherent manner that smoothly phases down operations and returns personnel and equipment to their home bases. For example, planners should retain adequate C2 and force protection assets in-theater to cover personnel and materiel during the redeployment. In some cases (such as in humanitarian or peacekeeping operations), forces or capabilities may not be immediately withdrawn until an indigenous capability is established. In other cases, forces may be swinging from one area of conflict directly into another. In this case, the smooth flow of forces and support must be carefully planned to ensure the smooth buildup of combat capability into the new theater. Proper planning for these types of actions is as important as the initial planning.

***At the Very Heart of Warfare lies Doctrine. . .***



## Suggested Readings

Meilinger, Phillip, editor, *The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory* (Air University Press) 1997.

Naveh, Shimon, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: the Evolution of Operational Theory* (Frank Cass) 1997.

Air Force Instruction 13-1 AOC, volume 3, *Operational Procedures—Aerospace Operations Center*, 1999.

Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces* (UNAAF), 1995.

Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, 1995.

Joint Publication 3-56.1, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*, 1994.

Any US Air Force officer assigned to high levels of command or staff, and certainly any officer who may potentially serve as a COMAFFOR, JFACC, or JFC, should be familiar with the full breadth of US Air Force operations. As a beginning, they should read the entire series of the keystone operational doctrine documents. Currently, these documents are:

- ✿ AFDD 2-1, *Air Warfare*.
- ✿ AFDD 2-2, *Space Operations*.
- ✿ AFDD 2-3, *Military Operations Other Than War*.
- ✿ AFDD 2-4, *Combat Support*.
- ✿ AFDD 2-5, *Information Operations*.
- ✿ AFDD 2-6, *Air Mobility*.
- ✿ AFDD 2-7, *Special Operations*.
- ✿ AFDD 2-8, *Command and Control*.

To obtain, review, or comment on US Air Force doctrine documents, visit the Air Force Doctrine Center website at <http://wwwdoctrine.af.mil>



## **APPENDIX A**

### **OPERATIONS REPORT-3**

#### **Voice Report:**

"This is a PINNACLE/CINC ASSESSMENT from USCINCCENT for the NMCC. In response to a report by USCENTCOM FORWARD BRIGHT STAR that an attack by rebel forces on Blueland Desert West Air Base has taken place, US forces in position for Exercise BRIGHT STAR will maintain an increased alert posture and will be prepared to assist the Government of Blueland as required. Support will initially be limited to aerial warning and surveillance capability using E-3As and RC-135s currently in place at Desert West Air Base for Exercise BRIGHT STAR. Confirmation message will follow."

#### **Message Report:**

{PRECEDENCE}

FROM: USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL

TO: NMCC WASHINGTON DC

{OTHER ADDRESSEES AS REQUIRED}

CLASSIFICATION

OPER/BLUENOSE//

MSGID/OPREP-3PCA/USCINCCENT//

REF/A/VMG/USCINCCENT/120050ZAPRXX//

AMPN/VOICE REPORT TO NMCC//

FLAGWORD/PINNACLE/COMMAND ASSESSMENT//

GENTEXT/COMMAND ASSESSMENT/

1. ( ) REBEL FORCES HAVE ATTACKED BLUELAND A/C AT DESERT WEST AB. VOICE REPORT TO NMCC 120050Z APR \_\_\_\_\_.  
2. ( ) USCENTCOM FWD {BRIGHT STAR} HAS REPORTED REBEL FORCES INFILTRATED DESERT WEST AB AND DETONATED EXPLOSIVE CHARGES ON TWO BLUELAND F-4S AND ONE F-16 CAUSING CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE TO THE A/C.  
3. ( ) ONE REBEL KILLED AND ANOTHER CAPTURED. IT APPEARS REBELS ARE BEING SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF YELLOWLAND.  
4. ( ) INTENTIONS OF BLUELAND FORCES ARE UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.  
5. ( ) US FORCES IN POSITION FOR EXERCISE BRIGHT STAR ARE ON INCREASED ALERT AND WILL BE PREPARED TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF BLUELAND, AS REQUIRED.

6. ( ) SUPPORT INITIALLY WILL BE LIMITED TO AERIAL WARNING AND SURVEILLANCE USING E-3AS AND RC-135S CURRENTLY IN PLACE AT DESERT WEST AB FOR EXERCISE BRIGHT STAR.
7. ( ) ANTICIPATE FURTHER OPREP-3 REPORTS ON THIS INCIDENT.//

## **APPENDIX B**

### **JCS WARNING ORDER**

1. **Purpose.** The warning order will be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate Phase III, Course of Action Development. If the crisis warrants change in the alert status of units or prepositioning of units, then the warning order can contain a deployment preparation order or deployment order. The warning order is normally approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If the order contains deployment of forces, Secretary of Defense authorization is required.
2. **When Issued.** The warning order will be issued at the earliest practicable time following recognition of a crisis.
3. **How Issued.** The warning order normally will be issued by record communication, using a precedence of IMMEDIATE or FLASH, as appropriate. If the situation is time-sensitive, voice communications or a Global Command and Control System (GCCS) NEWSGROUP should be used initially to pass warning order information. A voice order or a GCCS NEWSGROUP may be acted on immediately; however, a record communication will be forwarded as soon as practicable to confirm oral or GCCS NEWSGROUP orders, tasks, etc., and to keep all crisis participants informed. The focal point system will be used if the situation dictates. Restricted access special category (SPECAT) handling with a specific authorized code word on messages is often used to ensure maximum security for operational intentions and is generally transmitted to predetermined addressees.
4. **Contents.**
  - a. The warning order of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff generally equates to a planning directive in the deliberate planning process and should contain all readily available guidance pertaining to the crisis. The precise contents of the warning order may vary widely depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree of prior planning. Where little or no prior planning exists to meet a crisis, the supported commander will be given essential guidance necessary to permit him to begin crisis planning. The warning order should be issued as soon as possible, even if detailed guidance is not available. During the preparation of the warning order, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will use the GCCS NEWSGROUP to interact with the supported commander to ensure that mission requirements are adequately

detailed. Normally, the warning order will either allocate major combat and intertheater lift available for planning or request the supported commander's assessment of forces and intertheater lift required to accomplish the mission. Additional information should be sent as soon as possible, in message form, referencing the initial warning order.

- b. The warning order defines the objectives, anticipated mission or tasks, pertinent constraints, command relationships, and, if applicable, tentative combat forces available to the commander for planning and intertheater lift allocations. Further guidance relating to the crisis, such as changes to existing ROE or any specific directions from the NCA, will also be included as necessary, but maximum flexibility will be left to the supported commander in determining how to carry out the assigned mission and tasks.
- c. **Major paragraphs and items of information that should be considered for inclusion in the warning order are as follows:**
  - (1) **Purpose Statement.** State that the message is a warning order. Indicate specific task assignments or requests to supported and supporting commanders, such as the deadline for receipt of the commander's estimate and preliminary deployment estimates.
  - (2) **Situation.** Short summary of the situation, including the following, as appropriate:
    - (a) Political situation and possible enemy forces in the expected area of operation, and a brief description of the area of operation.
    - (b) Anticipated attitude and actions of friendly nations.
    - (c) Type, level, and source of major combat forces available for planning or a request for the commander's assessment of forces and intertheater lift required.
    - (d) Assumptions that may significantly affect the commander's planning.
  - (3) **Mission.** A concise statement of the mission to be accomplished and its purpose.
  - (4) **Execution.**
    - (a) Courses of Action. If the NCA and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wish specific COAs to be examined, they will be listed here. Otherwise, the supported commander will develop the COAs he/she considers

appropriate. Reference will be made to an existing OPLAN or CONPLAN if applicable.

- (b) OPSEC and Deception Guidance.
- (c) PSYOP Guidance.
  - 1. PSYOP Mission. Directions to conduct PSYOP in support of the military mission. Circumstances may dictate a more definitive statement.
  - 2. PSYOP Objectives. List specific target audience perceptions and behaviors sought.
  - 3. PSYOP Themes. List themes to stress and avoid to achieve each objective or refer to themes in an OPLAN.
- (d) Intelligence Guidance.
  - 1. Intelligence personnel and equipment available to augment the supported commander.
  - 2. Availability of national intelligence collection and communications assets.
  - 3. Delegation of signals intelligence (SIGINT) operational tasking authority.
  - 4. ROE for intelligence collection operations.
- (e) Counterintelligence (CI) Guidance.
  - 1. Designate Services to furnish CI elements.
  - 2. Establish CI liaison responsibilities.
  - 3. Develop CI collection requirements.
- (f) Civil Affairs (CA) Guidance.
  - 1. CA Mission. List required actions and specific results sought, such as minimizing interference and maximizing influence regarding the civilian population's impact on military operations; satisfying legal and moral obligations of the commander to the civil population; determining the availability of host-nation support resources; supporting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations; enhancing friendly nation stability and infrastructure development; and facilitating post-conflict restoration or transition activities.
  - 2. CA Objectives. List specific results sought, such as assessment of civil, indigenous, and host-nation support resources; support for humanitarian assistance

and population or resource control operations; assistance to civil requirements; facilitation of post-conflict transition activities; and enhancing friendly nation self-help capabilities to furnish socioeconomic services.

(g) Coordinating Instructions.

1. Tentative C-day and L-hour (if other than 0001Z) for planning.
2. Anticipated date of execution (D-day). The date may be highly tentative at this time, but it gives the commander a relative timeframe for planning, based on the NCA perception of urgency.
3. Anticipated duration of operations.
4. Defense readiness condition (DEFCON) or deployability posture.
5. Known operational constraints; e.g., overflight, port clearances.
6. Use of JOPES.
7. ROE guidance.
8. Supporting commander coordination or monitoring instructions.
9. Authorization for direct liaison between commanders.

(5) **Administration and Logistics.**

(a) Transportation, as follows:

1. Airlift movement priority.
2. Allocation of intertheater lift resources available for planning, if applicable (number and type, if known).
3. Load planning factors for each lift resource type, if available (allowable cabin load (ACL); number of passengers; outsize, bulk, and oversize cargo).
4. Other strategic movement planning guidance as appropriate (such as fund cites for pre-positioning intertheater lift resources).

(b) JOPES instructions.

(c) Force activity designators (FADs) assigned to forces in the operation or CJCS project code if warranted. (The CJCS project code is obtainable from Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board [JMPAB].)

- (d) Known logistics constraints.
- (e) Personnel deployment criteria.
- (f) Code words or nicknames of the operation.
- (g) Reporting instructions: special instructions and suspenses for the submission of reports.
- (h) Classification and declassification guidance.
- (i) Public affairs guidance.
- (j) Combat camera.
- (k) Restricted access SPECAT handling.

(6) **Command and Signal.**

- (a) Communications guidance.
- (b) Command relationships. Specify the supported and supporting commanders and supporting agencies, coordination instructions, and list the NCA-approved command relationship the gaining command will exercise (COCOM, OPCON, TACON) over transferred forces (if known and if NCA approval has been obtained at this point in the crisis response).
- (c) GCCS NEWSGROUP guidance.

**5. Deployment Preparation Orders and Deployment Orders.** If required by prevailing circumstances, the warning order may include a deployment preparation order or deployment order, i.e., changes to alert status of units and movement of selected forces to preposition for impending operations. If the warning order contains such information, the first paragraph will state "This is a warning order. The Secretary of Defense has authorized..."



## **APPENDIX C**

### **PLANNING ORDER**

1. **Purpose.** The planning order may be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate Phase V for the supported commander. It does not eliminate the CJCS requirement in Phase IV to obtain NCA approval of a COA before execution in Phase VI. The planning order is normally approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. **When Issued.** A planning order is issued when execution planning is desired before NCA approval of a COA is obtained or to compress the phases of the CAP while obtaining NCA approval on a CJCS-recommended COA.
3. **How Issued.** A planning order is normally issued by record communication using a precedence of IMMEDIATE or FLASH. If the situation is sufficiently time-sensitive, voice communications, GCCS NEWSGROUP, or video teleconferencing (VTC) can be used to pass planning order information; however, a record communication will be forwarded as soon as practicable to confirm oral or GCCS NEWSGROUP orders, tasks, etc., and to keep all crisis participants informed.
4. **Contents.**
  - a. At the Joint Staff level, the planning order generally equates to a planning directive in the deliberate planning process and will contain all readily available guidance pertaining to the crisis. The precise contents of the planning order may vary widely depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree of prior planning. Where little or no prior planning exists to meet a crisis, the supported commander will be given the guidance necessary to permit him to begin crisis planning. The planning order should be issued as soon as possible, even if detailed guidance is not available. Normally, the planning order will allocate major combat forces and intertheater lift available for planning. Additional information should be issued as soon as possible in message form and reference the initial planning order.
  - b. The planning order defines the objectives, anticipated mission or tasks, pertinent constraints, and, if applicable, tentative combat forces available to the commander for planning and intertheater lift allocations. Further guidance relating to the crisis, including any specific direction from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will also be included as necessary, but the supported

commander will retain maximum flexibility in determining how he/she will carry out assigned mission and tasks.

c. **Major paragraphs and items of information that should be considered for inclusion in the planning order are as follows:**

- (1) **Statement that the Message is a Planning Order.** State that the message is a planning order and indicate specific task assignments or requests to supported and supporting commanders, such as the deadline for receipt of the operation order. If not previously requested in a commander's estimate request order, assign USTRANSCOM the task of sending a preliminary deployment estimate and force closure profile to the supported commander and inform the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- (2) **Situation.** A short summary of the situation, including the following, as appropriate:
  - (a) Political situation and possible enemy forces in the expected area of operation and a brief description of the area of operation.
  - (b) Anticipated attitude and actions of friendly nations.
  - (c) Type, level, and source of major combat forces available for planning or a request for the commander's assessment of forces and intertheater lift required.
  - (d) Assumptions that may significantly affect the commander's planning.
- (3) **Mission.** A concise statement of the mission to be accomplished and its purpose.
- (4) **Execution.**
  - (a) Course of Action. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will specify a COA to be planned. Reference may be made to an existing OPLAN, CONPLAN, or functional plan.
  - (b) OPSEC Guidance. Include guidance similar to that in the warning order.
  - (c) PSYOP Guidance.
    1. PSYOP Mission. Give directions to conduct PSYOP in support of the military mission. Circumstances may dictate a more definitive statement.

2. PSYOP Objectives. List specific target audience perceptions and behaviors sought.
3. PSYOP Themes. List themes to stress and avoid to achieve each objective or refer to theme in an OPLAN.

(d) Intelligence Guidance.

1. Intelligence personnel and equipment available to augment the supported commander.
2. Availability of national intelligence collection and communications assets.
3. Delegation of SIGINT operational tasking authority.
4. ROE for intelligence collection operations.

(e) Counterintelligence (CI) Guidance.

1. Designate Services to furnish forward CI elements.
2. Establish CI liaison responsibilities.
3. Develop CI collection requirements.

(f) Civil Affairs (CA) Guidance.

1. CA Mission. List required actions and specific results sought, such as minimizing interference and maximizing influence regarding the civilian population's impact on military operations; satisfying legal and moral obligations of the commander to the civil population; determining the availability of host-nation support resources; supporting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations; enhancing friendly nation stability and infrastructure development; and facilitating post-conflict restoration or transition activities.
2. CA Objectives. List specific results sought, such as determining assessment of civil, indigenous, and host-nation support resources; supporting humanitarian assistance and population or resource control operations; assisting civil requirements; facilitating post-conflict transition activities; and enhancing friendly nation self-help capabilities to furnish socioeconomic services.

(g) Coordinating Instructions.

1. Proposed C-day and L-hour (if other than 0001Z) for planning.

2. Anticipated date of execution (D-day). This date may be tentative at this time, but it gives the commander a relative timeframe for planning, based on the CJCS perception of urgency.
3. Anticipated duration of operations.
4. DEFCON or deployability posture.
5. Known operational constraints; e.g., overflight, port clearances, and revisions to existing ROE.
6. USTRANSCOM coordination and monitoring instructions.
7. Authorization for direct liaison between commanders.

(5) **Administration and Logistics.**

- (a) Transportation, as follows:
  1. Airlift movement priority.
  2. Allocation of intertheater lift resources available for planning, if applicable (number and type if known).
  3. Load planning factors for each type of lift resource, if available (ACL; number of passengers; outsize, bulk, and oversize cargo).
  4. Other strategic movement planning guidance as appropriate (such as fund cites for pre-positioning intertheater lift resources).
- (b) JOPES instructions.
- (c) Force activity designators (FADs) assigned to forces in the operation or CJCS project code if warranted. (CJCS project code obtainable from JMPAB.)
- (d) Known logistics constraints.
- (e) Personnel deployment criteria.
- (f) Code words and code numbers of the operation.
- (g) Reporting instructions: special instructions and suspenses for the submission of reports.
- (h) Classification and declassification guidance.
- (i) Public affairs guidance.
- (j) Combat camera.
- (k) Restricted access SPECAT handling.

(6) **Command and Signal.**

- (a) Communications guidance.
- (b) Command relationships. Include a designation of supported and supporting commanders, coordination instructions, and listing of the command relationships (COCOM, OPCON, TACON) being proposed for NCA approval that the gaining commander may exercise over transferred forces and the locations where the transfer will be effective (normally the AOR boundary). When it is decided that forces will not transfer from one CINC to another, but those forces must perform actions at the direction of the supported commander, then a "support" relationship must be established between the two combatant commanders.
- (c) GCCS NEWSGROUP guidance.



## **APPENDIX D**

### **ALERT ORDER**

1. **Purpose.** The alert order is issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The alert order requires Secretary of Defense authorization because it conveys the NCA decision on COA selection that might initiate execution planning.
2. **When Issued.** An alert order is normally issued following a decision by the NCA that conduct of military operations in support of national interests is a distinct possibility. The alert order is normally issued after the commander's estimate is received. In a rapidly developing situation, however, the alert order may be issued immediately following recognition of a crisis without the prior exchange of information normally included in Phases I, II, and III of CAP procedures, or it may be omitted if a planning order has been issued.
3. **How Issued.** The alert order is issued by record communication, normally using a precedence of IMMEDIATE. In a particularly time-sensitive situation, a FLASH precedence or an emergency action message may be appropriate. Oral or other teleconferencing notification should be made, but must be followed by record communication.
4. **Contents.**
  - a. The specific contents of the alert order may vary widely, as with the warning order or planning order, depending on the nature of the crisis and the degree of prior planning. An existing plan may be applicable as written, partially applicable, or adapted to fit the particular crisis. When no existing plan is adaptable to the crisis, the emergency preparation of an OPORD may be necessary.
  - b. The alert order generally follows the major paragraph headings of an OPORD and may include any or all of the information listed in subparagraphs 4b(1) through (6) below. For valid information previously covered in the warning order or planning order, reference to the order is sufficient. Information that is not applicable or is irrelevant to execution planning may be omitted. Where an OPLAN is applicable, only minimal information such as the target date for execution or changes in ROE may be necessary.

**The following format is designed to serve as a checklist for guidance information that may be relevant.** It is not intended as a listing of mandatory information, and unnecessary headings should be deleted in situations where they are not required.

- (1) **Authority.** Statement indicating authority for issuing the alert order. Indicate specific task assignments or requests to supported and supporting commanders.
- (2) **Situation.** A description of the current politico-military situation as developed in the latest Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) intelligence assessment. Reference to enemy and friendly forces is not required unless necessary for execution planning or not otherwise available to the supported commander.
- (3) **Mission.** A refined statement of the tasks and purpose to be accomplished. It may or may not have changed from the anticipated mission previously given in the warning order or planning order or the estimate of the supported commander.
- (4) **Execution.**
  - (a) Course of Action. The COA as finally approved by the NCA in clear, precise military objectives. This will be the basis for the concept of operations of the supported commander.
  - (b) Combat Forces. A listing of the combat forces approved for the operation.
  - (c) Intertheater Lift Prepositioning. Authority, if appropriate, to preposition lift assets preparatory to deployment operations.
  - (d) OPSEC Guidance.
  - (e) PSYOP Guidance.
  - (f) Intelligence Guidance.
  - (g) Counterintelligence Guidance.
  - (h) Civil Affairs Guidance.
  - (i) Coordinating Instructions.
    1. Proposed C-day and L-hour for deployments.
    2. Proposed M-day for mobilization.
    3. Target D-day for execution.
    4. Estimated duration of the operation.
    5. DEFCON or deployability posture.
    6. Operational constraints, including any special ROE for this specific operation.

7. Release of Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP)-committed forces.
8. Unit combat readiness criteria.
9. Authorization for direct liaison between commands.

(j) Public Affairs Guidance. See CJCS warning or planning order.

(k) Combat Camera Guidance. See CJCS warning or planning order.

(5) **Administration and Logistics.**

- (a) Transportation, as follows:
  1. Airlift movement priority.
  2. Maximum numbers and types of intertheater lift resources available.
  3. Load-planning factors for each type of lift resources.
  4. Other strategic movement planning guidance, as appropriate.
- (b) Force activity designator (FAD) assigned to forces in the operation or CJCS project code, if warranted.
- (c) Fund citations, authorization to commit resources, or both.
- (d) Personnel deployment criteria.
- (e) Code names and code numbers of the operation.
- (f) Reporting instructions.
- (g) Classification and declassification guidance.
- (h) Known logistics constraints.

(6) **Command and Signal.**

- (a) Communications Guidance: Specific guidance on request of CJCS-controlled assets.
- (b) Command Relationships.
  1. Designation of supported and supporting commanders and coordination instructions.
  2. NCA-approved command relationships (COCOM, OPCON, TACON) the gaining commander will exercise over forces transferred by the NCA and locations where the force transfers will be effective (normally AOR boundary).

5. **Deployment preparation orders or deployment orders.** If required by circumstances, the alert order may include a deployment preparation order or deployment order, i.e., changes to alert status of units and movement of selected forces to preposition for impending operations.

**Note:** Items previously included in the warning order or planning order or deployment preparation or deployment order need not be repeated unless information has changed.

## **APPENDIX E**

# **OPERATION ORDER**

This appendix contains a description of the general format for an operation order (OPORD) used in crisis action planning (CAP) and an overview of the kinds of information included in it and how that information is organized. This appendix describes generically the types of information included in that format and gives general examples. Refer to actual joint publications for complete details.

1. **Transmission Information.** Standard message transmission information is included. The message is from the command originating the OPORD, normally the supported commander. Appropriate planning participants and supporting and subordinate commands as identified by the originator are action addressees. Information addressees are all other interested planning participants as determined by the originator and, in some cases, specific addressees identified in the implementing directive. Distribution is by policy and procedure of the issuing headquarters.
2. **Task Organization.** This section describes the task organization and forces required to conduct the operation. Forces may or may not be sourced, depending on the point to which detailed planning has progressed when the OPORD is sent. Information should be given in sufficient detail so all concerned understand the size and composition of forces involved, and the command organization to be used to employ them.
3. **Beginning Text.** This section of the OPORD contains the security classification of the message, message identification information, references, time zone reference, and identification of the supported operation.
4. **Situation.** Give briefly the general picture, so that subordinate commanders will understand the current situation, under the following headings.
  - a. **Enemy Forces.** Give composition, disposition, location, movements, estimated strengths, identification, and capabilities. Summarize the enemy situation in the intended area of operations. References may be made to other record documents that amplify information included here.
  - b. **Friendly Forces.** Give information on friendly forces that may directly affect the action of subordinate commanders. These forces include those not attached or organic to the command for the

contemplated operation, but whose presence on a flank or other adjacent area is of interest. Include information on such forces that subordinate commanders need to know to accomplish their tasks.

5. **Mission.** State clearly and concisely the task of the commander and its purpose. The mission of the command as a whole for the contemplated operation is stated here in full.
6. **Execution.** Summarize the overall course of action intended, or concept of operations. In subsequent paragraphs, assign specific tasks to each element of the task organization charged with the execution of operations required to accomplish the concept of operations or support those operations, and give details of coordination and task organization not already given in the task organization section. Instructions applicable to two or more elements of the task organization can be set forth in a final paragraph of this section headed "coordinating instructions."
  - a. **Concept of Operations.** Describe, in brief, how the commander visualizes the execution of the operation from start to completion. Accurately convey to subordinates the commander's intent so that mission accomplishment is possible in the time available and in the absence of additional communications or further instructions. The concept should set forth the phases of the operation; schemes of maneuver for major subordinate task elements that describe precisely what the commander expects to be done; general plans for employment of supporting fires and weapons, including nuclear weapons; and the general plan for the landing force in amphibious operations.
  - b. **Task Assignments.** Following the concept of operations, subsequent paragraphs of the execution section assign specific tasks to each element of the task organization charged with execution of operations to accomplish the concept of operations.
  - c. **Coordinating Instructions.** The last paragraph in the execution section contains coordinating instructions pertaining to two or more elements of the task organization. Typically, such instructions might include boundaries, objectives, beaches, lines of departure, time and direction of attack, and other specifics needed to coordinate the activities of different task elements. Other information is also included, such as reporting instructions, anticipated time of execution (D-day and H-hour), and when the order becomes effective for planning and/or execution.

7. **Administration and Logistics.** State administrative and logistics arrangements applicable to the operation. Describe the manner of logistics support for the contemplated operation. Include enough information to make clear the basic concept for logistics support. Summarize the overall operation from the combat service and combat service support perspectives. List materiel and services for supply, maintenance, transportation, and construction, and allocation of labor for logistics purposes. List plans and policies for hospitalization and evacuation of military and civilian personnel. List unit strengths, replacements, and personnel policies and procedures, including those pertaining to civilians and enemy prisoners of war. Describe control of civil population, refugees, and other relevant civil affairs matters. In many cases, reference to administration and logistics policies and procedures in an existing plan as amended by the OPORD will suffice.

8. **Command and Signal.** Include signal, recognition, and identification instructions; electronic policy; headquarters locations and movements; code words; code names; and liaison.

- a. **Command, Control, and Communications.** Give information about pertinent command, control, and communications nets; operating procedures; recognition and identification procedures; electronic emission constraints; and so on. A separate annex may be required, or reference to an existing plan may be made.
- b. **Command.** Joint operations can have complex command relationships. Joint OPORDs must be specific concerning these arrangements, including shifts that may take place as the operation progresses from one phase to the next. Clearly state all command relationships. Include command posts, alternate command posts, flagships, and alternate flagships along with their times of activation and inactivation.



## **APPENDIX F**

### **EXECUTE ORDER**

1. **Purpose.** The execute order will be issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to direct execution of an OPORD or other military operation to implement an NCA decision. The execute order will be issued by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense.
2. **When Issued.** The execute order will be issued on decision by the NCA to execute a military operation. Under the full CAP procedures, an execute order would normally result from an NCA decision, following execution planning initiated by a planning or alert order. In a particularly time-sensitive situation requiring an immediate response, an execute order may be issued without prior formal crisis planning, as would normally take place in Phases I through V of CAP.
3. **How Issued.** Normally, the execute order will be issued by record communication with IMMEDIATE or FLASH precedence. If the situation is sufficiently time-sensitive, voice communication or GCCS NEWSGROUP may be used initially to pass the execute order, with immediate follow-up record communication to confirm oral or GCCS NEWSGROUP orders and keep all crisis participants informed.
4. **Contents.**
  - a. When prior execution planning has been accomplished through adaptation of an existing plan or the development of an emergency OPORD, most of the guidance necessary for execution will already have been passed to the implementing commands, either through an existing plan or by a previously issued warning order, planning order, alert order, deployment preparation order, deployment order, or redeployment order. Under these circumstances, the execute order need contain only the authority to execute the planned operation and any additional essential guidance, such as the date and time for execution. Reference to previous planning documents is sufficient for additional guidance.
  - b. In the no-prior-warning response situation where a crisis event or incident requires an immediate response without any prior formal planning, the execute order must convey all essential guidance that would normally be issued in the warning order, planning order, and alert order. Under such rapid reaction conditions, the execute order will generally follow the same paragraph headings as the planning or alert order and may include the

information listed in the following subparagraphs. Information and subheadings that are not applicable should be omitted. If some information may be desirable but is not readily available, it can be included in a subsequent message, because the execute order will normally be very time-sensitive.

c. **Major paragraphs and items of information that should be considered for inclusion in the execute order are as follows:**

- (1) **Authority.** Statement indicating authority for issuing the execute order.
- (2) **Situation.** A description of the latest politico-military situation that has generated a need for a response by US military forces. Reference to enemy and friendly forces is not required unless necessary for execution planning and not otherwise available to the supported commander.
- (3) **Mission.** A refined statement of the tasks and purpose to be accomplished.
- (4) **Execution.**
  - (a) Course of Action. Deployment (if not previously directed) and employment of forces approved by the NCA through the CJCS. Special or unusual tasks assigned to a specific commander (supported or supporting) will be enumerated as required. Designation of supported and supporting commands in subparagraph 5c(6) below automatically incorporates normal mission task assignment.
  - (b) Major Combat Forces. A list of the major combat forces approved for the operation.
  - (c) OPSEC and Deception Guidance.
  - (d) PSYOP Guidance.
  - (e) Civil Affairs Guidance.
  - (f) Intelligence Guidance.
  - (g) Counterintelligence Guidance.
  - (h) Coordinating Instructions.
    1. C-day and L-hour for deployments.
    2. Target date and time for execution.
    3. Estimated duration of the operation. Circumstance or date that automatically terminates operations.
    4. DEFCON or deployability posture.

5. Operational constraints, including any special ROE applicable to this specific operation.
6. Release of SIOP-committed forces.
7. Unit combat readiness criteria.
8. Authorization for direct liaison between commands.

(5) **Administration and Logistics.**

- (a) Transportation, as follows:
  1. Airlift movement priority.
  2. Allocation of intertheater lift resources.
  3. Load planning factors for each type of lift resource.
  4. Other strategic movement planning guidance, as appropriate.
- (b) Force activity designator (FAD), if warranted.
- (c) Fund citations, authorization to commit resources, or both.
- (d) Personnel deployment criteria.
- (e) Reporting instructions.
- (f) Classification and declassification guidance, if required.
- (g) Known logistics constraints.
- (h) Public affairs guidance.
- (i) Combat Camera guidance.

(6) **Command and Signal.**

- (a) Communications Guidance. Any specific guidance on the use or release of CJCS-controlled C2 assets contained in the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE).
- (b) Command Relationships.
  1. Designation of supported and supporting commands and coordination instructions.
  2. NCA-approved command relationships (COCOM, OPCON, TACON) the gaining commander will exercise over forces transferred by the NCA and locations where the force transfers will be effective (normally AOR boundary). When it is decided that forces will not transfer from one CINC to another, but those forces must perform actions at the direction of the supported commander, then a "support" relationship must be established between the two combatant commanders.

**Note:** Items previously included in alert, planning, or warning orders need not be repeated unless information has changed.

## APPENDIX G

### RESERVE COMPONENT MOBILIZATION

**Mobilization.** The process whereby a nation makes the transition from a normal state of peacetime preparedness to a war-fighting posture. It involves the assembly, organization, and application of the nation's resources for national defense and it encompasses all activities necessary to prepare systematically and selectively for war.

**Volunteerism.** The program that allows the Secretary of the Air Force to place the Air Reserve Component (ARC) Selected Reserve on active duty. The ARC structure retains ADCON except for forces attached to the COMAFFOR; the COMAFFOR has specified ADCON over attached forces. OPCON transfers in accordance with SecDef orders. Volunteerism is usually used as a bridge to expand active force capabilities while awaiting legal authority for Presidential Selected Reserve Callup (PSRC) authority. *Volunteerism is currently being used to partially offset high active force operational tempos in the overseas theaters and in CONUS.*

**Presidential Selected Reserve Callup (PSRC).** The President may call up to 200,000 Selected Reserve members for up to 270 days to meet the requirements of an operational mission. The President must notify Congress of the action and his reasons for declaring PSRC. The ARC structure retains ADCON, except for forces attached to the COMAFFOR; the COMAFFOR has specified ADCON over attached forces. OPCON transfers in accordance with SecDef orders.

**Partial Mobilization.** In time of national emergency declared by the President or when otherwise authorized by law, up to 1 million reserve members may be involuntarily activated for not more than 24 consecutive months. The ARC structure retains ADCON, except for forces attached to the COMAFFOR; the COMAFFOR has specified ADCON over attached forces. OPCON transfers in accordance with SecDef orders.

**Full Mobilization.** This requires passage by Congress of a Public Law or Joint Resolution declaring war or national emergency. Provides authority to mobilize all reserve units and individuals in the existing force structure and the material resources to support the expanded structure. Specified ADCON transfers to the gaining COMAFFOR, and OPCON transfers in accordance with SecDef orders. At this time, the Air Reserve Personnel Center forwards the master personnel record of each mobilized ARC member to the Air Force Personnel Center and the field records group to the gaining military personnel flight.



## APPENDIX H

# JOINT AIR OPERATIONS PLAN

Copy No.  
Issuing Headquarters  
Place of Issue  
Date/Time Group of Signature

JOINT AIR OPERATIONS PLAN: (Number or Code name)

REFERENCES: Maps, charts, and other relevant documents.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: Briefly describe the command organization (composition and relationships) for the JFC's campaign and the aerospace operations envisaged. Detailed information may be included in the command relationships annex. Cover component commanders, Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) and Airspace Control Authority (ACA) identities, and others as required.

1. **Situation:** Briefly describe the situation that the plan addresses (see JFC's estimate). The related CONPLAN or OPLAN should be identified as appropriate.

a. **Guidance:** Provide a summary of directives, letters of instructions, memoranda, treaties, and strategic plans, including any campaign/operations plans received from higher authority, that apply to the campaign.

- (1) Relate the strategic direction of the JFC's requirements.
- (2) List strategic objectives and tasks assigned to the command.
- (3) Constraints—list actions that are prohibited or required by higher authority (ROE and others as appropriate).

b. **Adversary Forces.** Provide a summary of pertinent intelligence data including information on the following:

- (1) Composition, location, disposition, movements, and strengths of major adversary forces that can influence action in the AOR/JOA.
- (2) Strategic concept (if known), should include adversary's perception of friendly vulnerabilities and adversary's intentions regarding those vulnerabilities.

- (3) Major objectives (strategic and operational).
- (4) Adversary commander's idiosyncrasies and doctrinal patterns.
- (5) Operational and sustained capabilities.
- (6) Vulnerabilities.
- (7) Centers of gravity and decisive points.

c. **Friendly Forces.** State here information on friendly forces not assigned that may directly affect the command.

- (1) Intent of higher, adjacent, and supporting US commands (e.g., USTRANSCOM, USSTRATCOM, USSOCOM, USSPACECOM).
- (2) Intent of higher, adjacent, and supporting allied or other coalition forces (e.g., NATO, Spain, Italy, Egypt, etc.).

d. **Assumptions.** State here assumptions applicable to the plan as a whole. Include both specified and implied assumptions.

2. **Mission.** State the joint aerospace task(s) and the purposes(s) and relationships(s) to achieving the JFC's objective(s).

3. **Aerospace Operations.**

- a. **Strategic or Operational Concept.** (Based on the relevant elements of the JFC strategy.) State the broad concept for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of major aerospace capable joint forces including the concepts of deception and psychological operations during the operation or campaign as a whole. (This section is a summary of details found in the annexes.)
  - (1) Joint aerospace force organization.
  - (2) Joint force aerospace objectives.
  - (3) Beddown overview.
  - (4) Operational missions.
  - (5) Phases of joint aerospace operations in relation to JFC operation or campaign plan.
  - (6) Timing and duration of phases.
- b. **Phase 1.** Provide a phase directive for each phase.
  - (1) Operational concept. Include operational objectives, plan of attack, and timing.
  - (2) General missions and guidance to subordinates and components' supporting and supported requirements. Ensure that missions are complementary.

- (3) Capabilities/forces required by role or capability. Should consider land, sea, air, space, special operations, and multinational.
- (4) Tasks of subordinate commands and components.
- (5) Reserve Forces. Location and composition. State "be prepared" missions. Include guidance on surge sorties if used as reserve capability.
- (6) Mobility. Consider transportation, ports, lines of communication, transit and overflight rights, reinforcement, reception and onward movement, and host-nation support arrangements.
- (7) Deception.
- (8) Psychological Operations. Ensure joint aerospace operations will support established psychological operations.

- c. **Phases II to XX (last).** Cite information as stated in subparagraph 3b above for each subsequent phase. Provide a separate phase for each step in the operation at the end of which a major reorganization of forces may be required and another significant operation initiated.
- d. **Coordinating Instructions.** If desired, instructions applicable to two or more phases or multiple events of the command may be placed here.

4. **Logistics.** Brief, broad statement of the sustainment concept for the joint aerospace operations with information and instructions applicable to the joint aerospace operations by phase. Logistics phases must be consistent with operational phases. This information may be listed separately and referenced here. This paragraph should address:

- a. Assumptions.
- b. Supply aspects.
- c. Maintenance and modifications.
- d. Medical Service.
- e. Transportation.
- f. Base development.
- g. Personnel.
- h. Foreign military assistance.
- i. Administrative management.
- j. Line(s) of communication.

- k. Reconstitution of forces.
- l. Joint and multinational responsibilities.
- m. Sustainment priorities and resources.
- n. Inter-Service responsibilities.
- o. Host-nation considerations.

5. **Command, Control, and Communications.**

- a. **Command.**
  - (1) Command relationships. State generally the command relationships for the entire joint aerospace operations or portions thereof. Indicate any transfer of forces contemplated during the joint aerospace operations, indicating the time of the expected transfer. These changes should be consistent with the operational phasing in paragraph 3. Give location of commander, JAOC, and command posts.
  - (2) Delegation of Authority.
- b. **Communications.**
  - (1) Communications. Plans of communications. (May refer to a standing plan or contained in an annex.) Include time zone to be used; rendezvous, recognition, and identification instructions; code; liaison instructions; and axis of signal communications as appropriate.
  - (2) Electronics. Plans of electronics systems. (May refer to standard plan or may be contained in an annex.) Include electronic policy and other such information as may be appropriate.
  - (3) Combat Camera. Plans for combat camera. (May refer to standard plan or may be contained in an annex.) Include digital still photo and motion video imagery transmission to the Pentagon's Joint Combat Camera Center.
  - (4) Armament Delivery Recording (ADR) (bomb and gun camera imagery). Plan for ADR. (May refer to a standard plan or may be contained in a combat camera annex.) Include imagery transmission to the Pentagon's Joint Combat Camera Center.

(Signed) (Commander)

ANNEXES: As required.

# Glossary

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>AADC</b>	area air defense commander
<b>ACA</b>	airspace control authority
<b>ACC</b>	Air Combat Command; air component commander
<b>ACL</b>	allowable cabin load
<b>ACO</b>	airspace control order
<b>ADCON</b>	administrative control
<b>ADR</b>	armament delivery recording
<b>AECT</b>	aeromedical evacuation team
<b>AEF</b>	Aerospace Expeditionary Force
<b>AEG</b>	aerospace expeditionary group
<b>AES</b>	aerospace expeditionary squadron
<b>AEW</b>	aerospace expeditionary wing
<b>AFDD</b>	Air Force Doctrine Document
<b>AFFOR</b>	Air Force forces
<b>AFI</b>	Air Force Instruction
<b>AFRC</b>	Air Force Reserve Command
<b>ALCT</b>	airlift control team
<b>AMC</b>	Air Mobility Command
<b>AMCT</b>	air mobility control team
<b>AMD</b>	Air Mobility Division
<b>AME</b>	air mobility element
<b>ANG</b>	Air National Guard
<b>AO</b>	area of operations
<b>AOC</b>	aerospace operations center
<b>AOR</b>	area of responsibility
<b>ARC</b>	Air Reserve Component
<b>ARCT</b>	air refueling control team
<b>ASETF</b>	Aerospace Expeditionary Task Force
<b>ATO</b>	air tasking order
<b>C2</b>	command and control
<b>CA</b>	civil affairs
<b>CAP</b>	crisis action planning
<b>CAS</b>	close air support
<b>C-day</b>	unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins
<b>CI</b>	counterintelligence

<b>CINC</b>	commander in chief; commander of a combatant command
<b>CJCS</b>	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
<b>COA</b>	course of action
<b>COCOM</b>	combatant command (command authority)
<b>COG</b>	center of gravity
<b>COMACC</b>	Commander, Air Combat Command
<b>COMAFFOR</b>	Commander, Air Force Forces
<b>COMAFSPACE</b>	Commander of US Air Force space forces
<b>COMSEC</b>	communications security
<b>CONPLAN</b>	operation plan in concept format
<b>CONUS</b>	continental United States
<b>CRAF</b>	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
<b>CSAF</b>	Chief of Staff of the Air Force
<b>CSAR</b>	combat search and rescue
<b>CW (P)</b>	composite wing (provisional)
<b>D-day</b>	unnamed day on which operations commence or are scheduled to commence
<b>DEFCON</b>	defense readiness condition
<b>DIRMOBFOR</b>	Director of Mobility Forces
<b>DOD</b>	Department of Defense
<b>EAS</b>	expeditionary airlift squadron
<b>EBS</b>	expeditionary bomber squadron
<b>EFS</b>	expeditionary fighter squadron
<b>FAD</b>	force activity designator
<b>GCCS</b>	Global Command and Control System
<b>H-hour</b>	specific time an operation or exercise begins
<b>IIW</b>	information in warfare
<b>ISR</b>	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
<b>IW</b>	information warfare
<b>JAOC</b>	joint air operations center
<b>JAOP</b>	joint air operations plan
<b>JCS</b>	Joint Chiefs of Staff
<b>JCSE</b>	Joint Communications Support Element
<b>JFACC</b>	joint force air component commander
<b>JFC</b>	joint force commander
<b>JFSOCC</b>	joint force special operations component commander

<b>JMPAB</b>	Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board
<b>JOA</b>	joint operations area
<b>JOPES</b>	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
<b>JSOACC</b>	joint special operations air component commander
<b>JSOTF</b>	joint special operations task force
<b>JTF</b>	joint task force
<b>L-hour</b>	specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence
<b>LNO</b>	liaison officer
<b>MAAP</b>	Master Air Attack Plan
<b>MAGTF</b>	Marine air-ground task force
<b>MAJCOM</b>	major command
<b>M-day</b>	unnamed day on which mobilization of forces begins
<b>MOOTW</b>	military operations other than war
<b>MTW</b>	major theater war
<b>NAF</b>	numbered air force
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NCA</b>	National Command Authorities
<b>NEO</b>	noncombatant evacuation operations
<b>OPCON</b>	operational control
<b>OPLAN</b>	operation plan
<b>OPORD</b>	operation order
<b>OPREP</b>	operations report
<b>OPSEC</b>	operations security
<b>PACAF</b>	Pacific Air Forces
<b>PSRC</b>	Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority
<b>PSYOP</b>	psychological operations
<b>ROE</b>	rules of engagement
<b>SECAF</b>	Secretary of the Air Force
<b>SecDef</b>	Secretary of Defense
<b>SIGINT</b>	signals intelligence
<b>SIOP</b>	Single Integrated Operation Plan
<b>SOF</b>	special operations forces
<b>SOLE</b>	special operations liaison element

<b>SPECAT</b>	special category
<b>SPINS</b>	special instructions
<b>SWA</b>	Southwest Asia
<b>TACC</b>	tanker airlift control center
<b>TACON</b>	tactical control
<b>TALCE</b>	tanker airlift control element
<b>TPFDD</b>	time-phased force and deployment data
<b>UCMJ</b>	Uniform Code of Military Justice
<b>USAF</b>	United States Air Force
<b>USCENTAF</b>	United States Central Command Air Forces
<b>USCINCCENT</b>	Commander in Chief, United States Central Command
<b>USCINCEUR</b>	Commander in Chief, United States European Command
<b>USCINCFJC</b>	Commander in Chief, United States Joint Forces Command
<b>USCINCPAC</b>	Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command
<b>USCINCSPACE</b>	Commander in Chief, United States Space Command
<b>USCINCSTRAT</b>	Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Command
<b>USCINCTRANS</b>	Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command
<b>USJFC</b>	United States Joint Forces Command
<b>USSOCOM</b>	United States Special Operations Command
<b>USSPACECOM</b>	United States Space Command
<b>USSTRATCOM</b>	United States Strategic Command
<b>USTRANSCOM</b>	United States Transportation Command

## Definitions

**administrative control.** Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called **ADCON**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**aerospace.** Of, or pertaining to, Earth's envelope of atmosphere and the space above it; two separate entities considered as a single realm for activity in launching, guidance, and control of vehicles that will travel in both entities. (Joint Pub 1-02) *[Of, or relating to, the total expanse beyond the earth's surface.]* {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the US Air Force and is offered for clarity}

**aerospace expeditionary force.** An organizational structure composed of force packages of capabilities that provides warfighting CINCs with rapid and responsive aerospace power. These force packages are tailored to meet specific needs across the spectrum of response options and will deploy within an Aerospace Expeditionary Task Force as aerospace expeditionary wings (AEWs), groups (AEGs), or squadrons (AESs). An AEF, by itself, is not a deployable or employable entity.

**aerospace power.** The use of lethal and nonlethal means by aerospace forces to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.

**air interdiction.** Air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**airlift.** Operations to transport and deliver forces and materiel through the air in support of strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. (AFDD 1)

**air refueling.** The capability to refuel aircraft in flight, which extends presence, increases range, and allows air forces to bypass areas of potential trouble. (AFDD 1)

**air superiority.** That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**air supremacy.** That degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**assign.** 1. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or

greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. 2. To detail individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. See also **attach**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**attach**. 1. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary. 2. The detailing of individuals to specific functions where such functions are secondary or relatively temporary, e.g., attached for quarters and rations; attached for flying duty. See also **assign**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**battlespace**. The commander's conceptual view of the area and factors that he must understand to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, and complete the mission. It encompasses all applicable aspects of air, sea, space, and land operations that the commander must consider in planning and executing military operations. The battlespace dimensions can change over time as the mission expands or contracts according to operational objectives and force composition. Battlespace provides the commander a mental forum for analyzing and selecting courses of action for employing military forces in relationship to time, tempo, and depth. (AFDD 1)

**centers of gravity**. Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (Joint Pub 1-02) *[They exist at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war]* {Italicized portion in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.}

**civil engineering**. Those combat support and combat service support activities that identify, design, construct, lease, or provide facilities, and that operate, maintain, and perform war damage repair and other engineering functions in support of military operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**close air support**. Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called **CAS**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**combatant command (command authority)**. The nontransferable command authority established by title 10, ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated

and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally, the authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called **COCOM**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**combat search and rescue.** A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war. Also called **CSAR**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**command and control.** The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called **C2**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**core competency.** The basic areas of expertise or the specialties that the Air Force brings to any activity across the spectrum of military operations whether as a single Service or in conjunction with the core competencies of other Services in joint operations. Core competencies represent both aerospace power application theory and physical capability represented in a well-trained and equipped air force. (AFDD 1)

**counterair.** A US Air Force term for air operations conducted to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority by the destruction or neutralization of enemy forces. Both air offensive and air defensive actions are involved. The former range throughout enemy territory and are generally conducted at the initiative of the friendly forces. The latter are conducted near or over friendly territory and are generally reactive to the initiative of the enemy air forces. (Joint Pub 1-02) *[Counterair integrates and exploits the mutually beneficial effects of offensive and defensive operations by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles,*

*antiaircraft guns, artillery, and electronic warfare to destroy or neutralize enemy aircraft and missile forces both before and after launch.]* {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the US Air Force and is offered for clarity.} (AFDD 1)

**counterinformation.** Counterinformation seeks to establish a desired degree of control in information functions that permits friendly forces to operate at a given time or place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. Also called **CI.** (AFDD 2-5)

**counterland.** Operations conducted to attain and maintain a desired degree of superiority over surface operations by the destruction, disrupting, delaying, diverting, or other neutralization of enemy forces. The main objectives of counterland operations are to dominate the surface environment and prevent the opponent from doing the same. (AFDD 1)

**countersea.** Operations conducted to attain and maintain a desired degree of superiority over maritime operations by the destruction, disrupting, delaying, diverting, or other neutralization of enemy naval forces. The main objectives of countersea operations are to dominate the maritime environment and prevent the opponent from doing the same. (AFDD 2-1.4)

**counterspace.** Those offensive and defensive operations conducted by air, land, sea, space, special operations, and information forces with the objective of gaining and maintaining control of activities conducted in or through the space environment. (AFDD 1)

**defensive counterair operation.** Operations to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy enemy air and missile forces attempting to attack or penetrate the friendly air environment. These operations are synonymous with air defense operations. They encompass both active and passive measures and are normally conducted near or over friendly territory and generally react to the initiative of enemy forces. Also called **DCA.** (AFDD 1)

**doctrine.** Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**force protection.** Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in

all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (JP 1-02) Because terminology is always evolving, the Air Force believes a more precise definition is: *[Measures taken to prevent or mitigate successful hostile actions against Air Force people and resources while not directly engaged with the enemy.]* {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.}

**information.** 1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. 2. The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**information-in-warfare.** Involves the Air Force's extensive capabilities to provide global awareness throughout the range of military operations based on integrated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets; information collection/dissemination activities; and global navigation and positioning, weather, and communications capabilities. Also called **IIW**. (AFDD 2-5)

**information operations.** Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called **IO**. (DODD S-3600.1). The US Air Force believes that in practice a more useful working definition is: *[Those actions taken to gain, exploit, defend or attack information and information systems and includes both information-in-warfare (IIW) and information warfare (IW).]* {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the US Air Force and is offered for clarity.}

**information superiority.** The capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. Also called **IS** (DODD S-3600.1) The US Air Force prefers to cast "superiority" as a state of relative advantage, not a capability, and views IS as: *[That degree of dominance in the information domain that allows friendly forces the ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend information without effective opposition.]* {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the US Air Force and is offered for clarity.}

**information warfare.** Information operations conducted during time of crises or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. Also called **IW**. (DODD S-3600.1). The US Air

Force believes that, because the defensive component of IW is always engaged, a better definition is: *[Information operations conducted to defend one's own information and information systems, or to attack and affect an adversary's information and information systems.]* {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the US Air Force and is offered for clarity.}

**intelligence.** 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**interdiction.** An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**intertheater airlift.** Airlift that operates between the continental United States and a theater or between theaters. *[Formerly strategic airlift]* (AFDD 1)

**intratheater airlift.** The common-user air transportation and delivery of personnel and equipment within a commander in chief's area of responsibility. *[Formerly called theater airlift]* (AFDD 1)

**joint doctrine.** Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. See also **doctrine.** (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint force.** A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. See also **joint force commander.** (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint force air component commander.** The joint force air component commander derives authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders, redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander's

responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint force commander's apportionment decision). Using the joint force commander's guidance and authority, and in coordination with other Service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas. Also called **JFACC**. See also **joint force commander**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint force commander.** A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called **JFC**. See also **joint force**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint task force.** A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called **JTF**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**logistics.** The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations that deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**military operations other than war.** Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called **MOOTW**. (Joint Pub 1-02) *[An umbrella term encompassing a variety of military operations conducted by the Department of Defense that normally complement the other instruments of national power. These military operations are as diverse as providing support and assistance (when consistent with US law) in a nonthreatening environment, and conducting combat not associated with war.]* {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.} (AFDD 1)

**military strategy.** The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**National Command Authorities.** The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Also called **NCA**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**national strategy.** The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**offensive counterair operation.** An operation mounted to destroy, disrupt, or limit enemy airpower as close to its source as possible. (Joint Pub 1-02) *[Offensive counterair operations range throughout enemy territory and are generally conducted at the initiative of friendly forces. Also called OCA.]* (AFDD 1) {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the US Air Force and is offered for clarity.}

**operational control.** Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called **OPCON**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**operational level of war.** The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**reachback.** The process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, equipment, or materiel from Air Force organizations that are not forward deployed.

**reconnaissance.** A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**rules of engagement.** Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which the United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called **ROE**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**space control.** Operations to assure the friendly use of the space environment while denying its use to the enemy. Achieved through offensive and defensive counterspace carried out to gain and maintain control of activities conducted in or through the space environment. (AFDD 1)

**space power.** The capability to exploit space forces to support national security strategy and achieve national security objectives. (AFDD 1)

**space superiority.** That degree of dominance in space that permits the conduct of operations by land, sea, and aerospace forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. [This is a change to the definition given in AFDD-1, Sep 97]

**space support.** Those operations conducted with the objective of deploying, sustaining, and augmenting elements or capabilities of military

space systems. Space support consists of: spacelift and on-orbit support. (AFDD 1)

**special operations.** Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, nonspecial operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques, and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called **SO.** (Joint Pub 1-02)

**strategic attack.** Military action carried out against an enemy's center(s) of gravity or other vital target sets including command elements, war production assets, and key supporting infrastructure in order to effect a level of destruction and disintegration of the enemy's military capacity to the point where the enemy no longer retains the ability or will to wage war or carry out aggressive activity. (AFDD 1)

**strategic level of war.** The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish those objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**strategy.** The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**sustainment.** The provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful

accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**surveillance.** The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or sub-surface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**tactical control.** Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Also called **TACON**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**tactical level of war.** The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**tactics.** 1. The employment of units in combat. 2. The ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to use their full potentialities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**task force.** 1. A temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission. 2. Semi-permanent organization of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a continuing specific task. 3. A component of a fleet organized by the commander of a task fleet or higher authority for the accomplishment of a specific task or tasks. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**theater.** The geographical area outside the continental United States for which a commander of a combatant command has been assigned responsibility. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**war.** Open and often prolonged conflict between nations (or organized groups within nations) to achieve national objectives. (AFDD 1)



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